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Three Proposals for Regulating the Distribution of
Home Equity
Ian Ayres and Joshua Mittst
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's recently-released
"qualified mortgage" rules effectively discourage predatory lending but miss
an equally important source of systemic risk: low-equity clustering. Specific
"volatility-inducing" mortgage terms, when present in a substantialcluster of
mortgage contracts, exacerbate macroeconomic risk by increasing the chance
that the housing and lending markets will have to absorb a wave of
simultaneous defaults after a downturn in housing prices. This Article shows
that these terms became prevalent in a substantialproportion of residential
mortgages in the years leading up to the home mortgage crisis. In contrast,
during the earlier "amortization era" (when mortgagors were more likely to
borrow at different times, with more substantial down payments, and more
continual rates of amortization, without a need to refinance), an equally-sized
negative shock to housing prices would likely produce less negative equity and
confine it to a smaller set of borrowers. Instead of prohibiting the volatilityinducing terms, this Article proposes three policies to better assure a greater
diversification in the distribution of equity: (a) a modified home-mortgage
interest deduction; (b) a modified "qualifiedresidential mortgages" standard;
and most importantly, (c) direct macroprudentialregulation through a "capand-trade" system of leverage licenses and through instituting varying degrees
of "conforming mortgages" for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Limiting the
simultaneous clustering of negative equity mortgages could reproduce the
structural advantages of the amortization era, when inevitable downturns
disparately impacted homeowners with different levels of equity and could
more easily be absorbedby the market.
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Introduction
One lesson from the Great Recession is abundantly clear: the terms of
other people's mortgages can affect our financial security. When other people
finance their housing purchases with little or no down payment, it increases
systemic risk in the housing market. But the legislative response to the crisis
has largely focused on trying to correct consumer errorI and has left the
external impacts of individual lending decisions unaddressed.
The Dodd-Frank Act instituted two regulatory regimes to discourage the
risky mortgage lending that led to the housing crisis: "qualified mortgages"
(QM) and "qualified residential mortgages" (QRM). One of these regulatory
responses to the crisis even found its way into the 2012 presidential elections.
In the first presidential debate, Governor Romney claimed:

I.
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Dodd-Frank correctly says we need to have qualified mortgages, and if you give
a mortgage that's not qualified, there are big penalties, except they didn't ever
go on and define what a qualified mortgage was. It's been two years. We don't
know what a qualified mortgage is yet. So banks are reluctant to make loans,
2
mortgages.

Two of these claims were incorrect. There are not "big penalties" for
originating non-QM loans. On January 10, 2013, the Consumer Financial

Protection Bureau (CFPB)' released rules giving lenders a safe harbor of
compliance with a statutory mandate to verify a borrower's ability-to-repay for
qualified mortgages.3 But lenders can still offer non-qualified mortgages by
performing the requisite verification. 4 And the delay in promulgating the QM
rules could not have kept banks from lending because the ability-to-pay
5
mandate was suspended until the QM rules were promulgated.
On the other hand, Dodd-Frank's "qualified residential mortgages"
(QRM) rules do impose a penalty for noncompliance. Under a proposal by six
federal agencies in April 2011, mortgage securitizers must retain 5% of the
credit risk of any mortgage with a down payment lower than 20%.6 While this
and other requirements for a QRM loan-such as fully amortizing payments
with no deferring principal or balloons, no negative amortization, and no debtto-income ratio greater than 28%7-effectively reduce predatory lending, a
20% minimum down payment imposes a harsh burden on borrowers who are
creditworthy but lack the wealth to provide such a large amount of cash up
front.
More fundamentally, the proposed QRM rules do not effectively address
the systemic consequences of mortgage terms that, in aggregate, can exacerbate
market volatility. There is nothing individually irrational about a borrower and
lender agreeing that the borrower will borrow with a small down payment or
opting for a large repayment balloon in the future. But when millions of
borrowers make the same kind of bet, too many of these highly-leveraged loans

Suzy Khimm, How a Moderate Mitt Romney Says He'd Regulate Wall Street, WASH.
2.
POST: WONKBLOG (Oct. 4, 2012, 11:18 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp

/2012/10/04/how-a-moderate-mitt-romney-would-regulate-wall-street.
3. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in Lending Act,
12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(1)(i) (2013).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(1) (2012) ("Any creditor with respect to any residential
4.
mortgage loan, and any assignee of such loan subject to liability under this subchapter, may presume that
the loan has met the requirements of subsection (a), if the loan is a qualified mortgage." (emphasis
added)).
See id. § 1639c(a)(1) ("In accordance with regulationsprescribed by the Bureau, no
5.
creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable and good faith
determination based on verified and documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated,
the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan ..... (emphasis added)).
6.
See Credit Risk Retention Proposed Rules, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,099 (Apr. 29,

2011).
7.

See id. at 24,125. For an in-depth discussion of the QRM standard, see infra Section

III.C.
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make our housing markets less stable. QM and QRM thus under- and overreach: they largely fail to address the negative externality that high-risk lending
can have on the remainder of the economy, and when they try to do so-i.e., by
requiring a 20% down payment-they strike with a heavy hand not narrowly
tailored to the goal of reducing systemic risk.
A more effective regulatory solution begins by identifying the
phenomenon of "low-equity clustering." In the not-so-distant past, borrowers
were more likely to take out amortizing loans, which pay back principal and
interest with relatively constant monthly payments. During this amortization
era (which lasted roughly from the end of World War II until roughly the
beginning of President Clinton's term), at any point in time, different
homeowners would have varying degrees of equity built up in their houses.
Older homeowners would tend to own a larger proportion of their homes.
Younger families not as much. 8 This diversity in the degree of accrued equity
reduced market volatility because economic shocks causing housing prices to
drop would drive underwater only a relatively small proportion of the most
recent mortgages.
In contrast, the Great Recession shows the macroeconomic dangers of
uniformly high leverage. When a substantial proportion of the population has
less than 5% equity in their homes, a 15% drop in housing prices is likely to
cause a massive wave of defaults-further depressing housing prices and
prompting even more defaults. From the perspective of market stability, low
down payment mortgages with deferred or even negative amortization of
principal robbed our nation of the diverse equity cushion that it enjoyed in the
past.
In this Article, we focus on four different types of mortgage terms that,
when present in a substantial number of loans, make the housing and banking
markets more vulnerable to negative impacts from downturns in housing prices.
The four mortgage terms are: (1) high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios; (2) low or
delayed rates of amortization (including, for example, interest only loans); (3)
substantial balloon payment obligations; and (4) artificial interest rate increases
(for example, when interest rates rise at the end of a teaser rate period).
The first two of these terms directly reduce the size of the equity cushion
that will exist at any point in time during the mortgage repayment-either
because the initial down payment is a lower percentage of the purchase price or
because the subsequent monthly payments are structured to more slowly pay
back the outstanding principal. Even homeowners who initially borrow with
more traditional mortgages (larger down payments and amortizing over fifteen
to thirty years) are dynamically susceptible to "equity stripping," in which the
homeowner takes out subsequent loans that extract the value that is built up

8.

See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES AND HOMEOWNERSHIP IN

THE FOURTH QUARTER 2013, at 8, http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf (last
visited Feb. 14, 2014) (showing increasing homeownership rate with age from 2007-13).
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through the amortized repayment of the loan principal or through capital
appreciation of the underlying home. In the extreme case, repeated equity
stripping can dynamically transform amortizing mortgages into what in effect
are interest-only loans and even ratchet the outstanding principal toward any
capital appreciation in the home value. The combined impact of lower down
payments, lower amortization, and increased equity stripping when adopted by
a substantial group of homeowners leads to a phenomenon that we call "lowequity clustering." Low-equity clustering can exacerbate the impact of normal
housing price fluctuations by unleashing a simultaneous wave of defaults (that
would not have occurred under more traditional amortization distributions) as a
large segment of homeowners walk away from underwater mortgages.
The second two types of terms (balloons and artificial resets) increase the
risk of default when refinancing markets dry up after an initial fall in housing
prices. Traditional amortizing mortgages do not require homeowners to return
to the lending market to refinance the original principal. But mortgages with
balloon payments or payment resets (that outstrip homeowners' ability to pay)
force just this kind of refinancing. After an initial negative shock to housing
prices, prudent lenders may be unwilling to refinance the outstanding principal
of a mortgage when there is negative equity in a home at the time of the
refinancing.
Taken together, these four volatility-inducing loan terms (individually or
in combination) can exacerbate defaults either by increasing the number of
underwater mortgages or by undermining lenders' willingness to refinance
underwater mortgages. A central claim of this Article is that when substantial
segments of mortgagors include such terms in their mortgages, the housing and
lending markets are exposed to more systemic risk, because normal downturns
in housing prices will be magnified by the secondary wave of foreclosure-based
supply offered to the market after a rash of defaults. To absorb this terminduced foreclosure supply, the market price will fall further (which can in turn
cause subsequent term-induced defaults) than it would in a world with more
traditional mortgage terms.
Surprisingly, the regulatory response to the housing crisis has done little
to nothing to address the macroeconomic externalities of homeowners
bunching at very low levels of equity. The Dodd-Frank Act has attempted to
address this concern through the proposed exemption to risk retention rules for
qualified residential mortgages, 9 but there is still no federal law prohibiting
interest-only mortgages with zero percent down. It is as if regulators are
resigned to the idea that the amortization era is gone and there is nothing we
can do about it, or believe that the primary role for regulation is paternalisticto protect individual home lenders from making ill-advised borrowing
decisions.

9.

See discussion infra Section II.C.
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We support the consumer protection agenda. But there are also feasible
interventions to reduce the negative externalities caused by risk-inducing loan
terms. In this Article, we propose that the government auction off a limited
number of "leverage licenses," which lenders would need to obtain before
originating loans with particular kinds of terms. The licenses would directly
limit the degree of low-equity clustering. Instead of prohibiting low-equity
loans, the leverage licensing scheme would limit the number of high-leverage
loans so as to produce the kind of equity distribution that is more robust to the
unavoidable fluctuations in housing prices. Our licensing approach has distinct
advantages over a more traditional prohibitory model. First, from a libertarian
perspective, licensing grants more contractual liberty.' 0 Second, from the
perspective of macroeconomic stability, there is nothing wrong with a handful
of contractors including low-equity terms (or balloons or resets) in their
mortgages. The housing market can easily absorb the low-equity induced
defaults of a few highly leveraged loans. The systemic problem arises only
when substantial segments of loans include such terms.
The impulse to simply prohibit contractors from including the offending
terms derives from a kind of reverse aggregation fallacy. The traditional
aggregation fallacy stems from failing to consider whether the individual
benefits of a behavior would persist if everyone adopted the behavior. Thus, for
example, the individual benefits gained in standing at a football game are
eliminated if everyone stands. But we commit the reverse aggregation fallacy
when we fail to consider the comparatively small negative externalities that
would accrue if only a few people adopt a behavior. The social ills stemming
from mass clustering of low-equity loans do not imply that unclustered lowequity lending produces the same harms. In the mortgage setting the football
analogy does not hold. Unlike the first football fans, who block others by
standing, the first few borrowers with low-equity or low-amortization terms
produce at most only imperceptible negative effects on others in the market. A
system of limited licensing more narrowly tailors the restrictions of contractual
freedom to the specific externality concerns. With traded licenses, the right to
include the license terms will naturally flow to the contractors who value them
most highly.
Indeed, traditional prohibitory regulation may perversely induce just the
kinds of clustering that stability regulation should strive to eliminate. For
example, regulation that simply prohibits originations with loan-to-value ratios
of more than 95% may induce a large segment of borrowers to cluster just next
to the 5% down payment requirement-leaving the system particularly
vulnerable to downturns in housing prices of, say, 6-10%. Traditional
prohibitions may be particularly ill suited to the regulatory goal of inducing the

10.
A libertarian commitment to freedom of contract does not preclude limitations on
liberty in order to reduce social externalities.
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optimal macroeconomic distributions in contracting equilibria. Or put in terms
of traditional contract theory, mandatory rules are well suited to inducing
pooling equilibria, but can be less useful when the regulatory goal is to produce
non-pooling equilibria in which different contractors opt for different contract
terms.
In this Article, we propose three complementary reforms that could be
used individually or together to reduce the problems of low-equity clustering.
First, we suggest that the home equity deduction be limited to loans that are
more likely to amortize over time and have no balloon payments or artificial
interest rate resets. Second, we suggest reforms to the proposed QRM riskretention rules to give originating lenders better incentives to offer loans that
would produce better distributions of risk. And lastly we propose direct
macroprudential regulation of the distribution of home equity through (1) a
system of tradable leverage licenses that would allow a limited number of loans
at different equity ranges, and (2) a new paradigm of "conforming mortgages"
for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Part I of this Article demonstrates that the legal response to the recent
housing crisis fails to address low-equity clustering. Part II presents evidence
establishing (1) the rising prevalence of particular mortgage terms and (2) the
link between low-equity clustering and the downturn in housing prices during
the recent crisis. Part III critiques existing policies that encourage low-equity
clustering and suggests two reforms to promote greater diversification in the
distribution of equity. Part IV proposes direct macroprudential regulation of the
distribution of home equity through a system of tradable leverage licenses and
reforms to the "conforming mortgage" system for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
to increase stability in the housing market.
I. The Limited Legal Response to Low-Equity Clustering
A. Consumer Protection, PredatoryLending, and QualifiedMortgages Under
the Dodd-FrankAct

The Dodd-Frank Act and the related regulatory responses to the housing
and financial crisis of 2007-2009 fall short of comprehensively addressing a
fundamentally important source of systemic risk to housing markets: the
aggregate effect of the distribution of certain types of risky individual mortgage
terms. In its report on the financial crisis, the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (FCIC) described the growth in the mid-2000s of high-risk
mortgage terms that would later have a devastating effect on society:
Direct-mail solicitations flooded people's mailboxes. Dancing figures, depicting
happy homeowners, boogied on computer monitors. Telephones began ringing
off the hook with calls from loan officers offering the latest loan products: One
percent loan! (But only for the first year.) No money down! (Leaving no equity
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if home prices fell.) No income documentation needed! (Mortgages soon dubbed
"liar loans" by the industry itself.) Borrowers answered the call, many believing
that with ever-rising prices, housing was the investment that couldn't lose.II
There is widespread consensus that mortgage terms such as these-e.g., "one
percent for the first year" or "no money down"-played a substantial role in the
causal chain leading to the meltdown in housing markets beginning in 2007.12
However, the regulatory response to the explosive growth of these terms
has focused almost exclusively on consumer protection. The FCIC emphasized
that borrowers "were misled by salespeople who came to their homes and
persuaded them to sign loan documents on their kitchen tables. Some borrowers
naively trusted mortgage brokers who earned more money placing them in
risky loans than in safe ones."13 When characterizing the growth of option
"adjustable rate mortgages" (ARM) loans-which featured interest rate resets
and negative amortization payment options-the FCIC quotes testimony that
borrowers were "steered or defrauded into entering option ARMs with teaser
rates or pick-a-pay loans forcing them to [pay] loans that they could never pay
off."l 4 When the FCIC discusses the role these mortgage terms played in
leading to the housing crisis, the clear implication is that consumers did not
realize the risk their loans entailed. 1
It is no surprise, then, that the Dodd-Frank Act, and rules promulgated
under the Act, have focused on protecting consumers from predatory lending.
Dodd-Frank established a new section 129C of the Truth-in-Lending Act,
which provides that "no creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless
the creditor makes a reasonable and good faith determination based on verified
and documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated, the
consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan."' 6 The statute expressly
mandates that the creditor consider:

11.

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL

COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS INTHE UNITED STATES, FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N 9 (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
12.
See, e.g., id. at 105.
13.
Id. at 7.
14.
Id. at 109 (quoting The FinancialCrisis at the Community Level-Sacramento, CA,
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N 228 (Sept. 23, 2010) (statement of Mona Tawatao), http://fcic-static.law
.stanford.edulcdnmedia/fcic-testimony/2010-0923-transcript.pdf). "Pick-a-pay" loans, also known as
option adjustable-rate mortgages, permit making "a partial-interest payment that adds the unpaid interest
to the loan's balance." Marshall Eckblad, Pick-a-Pay Loans: Worse than Subprime, WALL ST. J., July
14, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124744382165530247.html.
15.
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 11, at 6-7 ("Soon there were a
multitude of different kinds of mortgages available on the market, confounding consumers who didn't
examine the fine print, baffling conscientious borrowers who tried to puzzle out their implications, and
opening the door for those who wanted in on the action.").
16.
15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1) (2012).
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[T]he consumer's credit history, current income, expected income the consumer
is reasonably assured of receiving, current obligations, debt-to-income ratio or
the residual income the consumer will have after paying non-mortgage debt and
mortgage-related obligations, employment status, and other financial resources
other than the consumer's equity in the dwelling or real property that secures
repayment of the loan. A creditor shall determine the ability of the consumer to
repay using a payment schedule that fully amortizes the loan over the term of the
loan.

The statute also requires that creditors verify a borrower's income to prevent
fraud and take into account nonstandard terms when determining ability to
repay. For example, creditors must "take into consideration any balance
increase that may accrue from any negative amortization provision, 20 and "use
the payment amount required to amortize the loan by its final maturity" for
interest-only loans.21 Section 129C also encourages creditors to refinance
borrowers into higher quality loans-e.g., with a lower interest rate, fully
amortizing payment schedule, and no balloon payment-by exempting such
refinancing loans from income verification.2 2
But the most important provision in section 129C is the presumption of
compliance with the ability-to-repay requirement for "qualified mortgages."23
Under the statute, a mortgage must contain the following elements to be a
"qualified mortgage": (1) fully amortizing with no deferring principal
repayment; (2) no balloon payment;25 (3) verification of the borrower's
income;26 (4) for fixed-rate loans, underwriting based on a fully amortizing
payment schedule including all taxes, insurance, and assessments; 27 (5) for
ARM loans, underwriting based on the maximum interest rate over the first five
years with the same payment schedule requirements for fixed-rate loans; 28 (6)
compliance with any maximum debt-to-income ratios set by the CFPB, which
has rulemaking authority for qualified mortgages;29 (7) no more than 3% in
points and fees; 30 and (8) maximum length of thirty years.31

17.

Id. § 1639c(a)(3).

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. § 1639c(a)(4).
Id. § 1639c(a)(6).
Id. § 1639c(a)(6)(C).
Id. § 1639c(a)(6)(B).
Id. § 1639c(a)(5).
Id. § 1639c(b)(1) ("Any creditor with respect to any residential mortgage loan, and

any assignee of such loan subject to liability under this subchapter, may presume that the loan has met

the requirements of subsection (a), if the loan is a qualified mortgage.").
24. Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(i).
25. Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(ii).
26. Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(iii).
27. Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(iv).

§ 1639c(b)(2)(A)(v).

28.

Id.

29.

Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(vi).

30.

Id.

§ 1639c(b)(2)(A)(vii).
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On January 10, 2013, the CFPB promulgated final rules implementing the
ability-to-repay standard and qualified mortgage exemption.32 These rules
clarified several ambiguities in the statutory definition. Specifically, the CFPB
provided for a safe harbor-a presumption of compliance with the ability-torepay standard-for qualified mortgages that are not "higher-priced" as defined
by the Federal Reserve Board's 2008 truth-in-lending rule. 3 3 The bureau also
used its authority under the statute to define a maximum total debt-to-income
ratio of 43% for qualified mortgages. 34 Finally, the CFPB provided for a
second, temporary category of qualified mortgages, which will enjoy the
benefit of the safe harbor based on somewhat looser criteria if they comply
with the underwriting criteria of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)
(while they remain under federal conservatorship), the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, the Department of Veterans Affairs, or the
Department of Agriculture or Rural Housing Service.35
The qualified mortgage standard as a safe-harbor proxy for a borrower's
ability to repay is predominantly driven by a regulatory consumer protection
concern. We support this type of soft paternalism.36 It is reasonable to protect
borrowers from making ill-advised loans.
But inadequate consumer protection should not be the government's only
concern. Macroprudential considerations militate in favor of regulating terms of
mortgage contracts that produce negative externalities in the form of
exacerbated systemic market risk. Individual lending decisions can have
negative externalities when they increase the risk of synchronized default. A
vast body of economic research has found a strong connection between
negative
equity-so-called
"underwater"
borrowers-and
default.
Theoretically, it is not in a rational homeowner's interest to make payments on
a mortgage with a principal balance greater than the value of the house.37 In a

Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(viii). There is also a provision for reverse mortgages, see id. §
31.
1639c(b)(2)(A)(ix).
32.
Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act, 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2013).
33.
Id. § 1026.43(e)(1)(i).
34.
Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi).
35.
Id. § 1026.43(e)(4).
Indeed, one of us recently advocated requiring lenders "who use non-default terms
36.
to undertake consumer surveys to establish that typical borrowers in real-world contexts understand the
non-default terms of the mortgage." Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory ofAltering
Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2102 (2012).
This is known as the "put option" theory of mortgage default, which was first
37.
articulated in Chester Foster & Robert Van Order, An Option-Based Model of Mortgage Default, 3
HOUSING FIN. REv. 351 (1984). The model was later developed through literature described and
evaluated in Kerry D. Vandell, How Ruthless is Mortgage Default? A Review and Synthesis of the
Evidence, 6 J. HOUSING RES. 245 (1995); and Roberto G. Quercia & Michael A. Stegman, Residential
Mortgage Default: A Review of the Literature, 3 J. HOUSING RES. 341 (1992). See also Yongheng Deng
et al., Mortgage Terminations,Heterogeneity and the Exercise ofMortgage Options, 68 ECONOMETRICA
275, 275 (2000) (synthesizing the put option literature and concluding that the model "in its most
straightforward version, does a good job of explaining default and prepayment, but it is not enough by
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world of zero transaction costs, he or she should simply default on the loan and
obtain a lower mortgage on an equivalent substitute house that now costs less.38
Of course, the real world is not free of transaction costs, 39 and subsequent
empirical studies have shown that "liquidity shocks" such as losing a job,
divorce, or unplanned medical expenses are usually necessary for negative
equity to lead to default. 40 But more recent empirical studies demonstrate that
negative equity remains a primary determinant of default. 41
The consumer protection approach reflected in the ability-to-repay
mandate and the qualified mortgage safe harbor does not address the
contribution that low-equity loans make to systemic risk as a result of these

itself'); Anthony Pennington-Cross & Giang Ho, The Termination of Subprime Hybrid and Fixed-Rate
Mortgages, 3 REAL ESTATE ECON. 399 (2010) (applying option theory to the subprime mortgage
termination).
38.
Theoretically, at least, a true substitute house should cost the same as the
borrower's current house, which has now dropped in value.
39.
See James B. Kau et al., Default Probabilitiesfor Mortgages, 35 J. URB. ECON. 278
(1994). Kau et al. argue that it is essential to take into account the loss of the possibility of future
prepayment of the mortgage when the termination option is exercised. See id. at 282. In their view,
transaction costs have no effect on the exercise of the termination option. But see John M. Quigley &
Robert Van Order, Explicit Tests of Contingent Claims Models of Mortgage Default, 11 J. REAL ESTATE
FIN. & EcoN. 99, 112 (1995) ("[E]mpirical analysis suggests that a zero transaction cost model is not
consistent with the data.").
40.
See Wayne R. Archer et al., The Effect of Income and Collateral Constraints on
ResidentialMortgage Terminations,26 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 235, 237 (1996) (finding that "the
termination behavior of households that are income- or collateral-constrained differs markedly from
unconstrained households"); Christopher L. Foote et al., Negative Equity and Foreclosure:Theory and
Evidence, 64 J. URB. EcON. 234, 245 (2008) ("The default decision involves weighing the payments on
the mortgage against the income, imputed or actual, that accrues from retaining ownership of the
house.").
41.
See Ronel Elul et al., What "Triggers" Mortgage Default?, 100 AM. EcoN. REV.
490 (2010) (finding support for both the negative equity and illiquidity theories of default); Laurie S.
Goodman et al., Negative Equity Trumps Unemployment in PredictingDefaults, 19 J. FIXED INCOME 67
(2010) (concluding that while negative equity is a stronger predictor of default than unemployment,
unemployment can function as a trigger of default when there is high negative equity); Patrick Bajari et
al., An EmpiricalModel of Subprime Mortgage Default from 2000 to 2007 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 14625, 2010), http://www.econ.umn.edu/-bajari/research/subprime.pdf
(concluding that negative equity is an important determinant of default but insufficient on its own);
Kristopher Gerardi et al., Subprime Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, Homeownership Experiences, and
Foreclosures 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos. Working Paper No. 07-15, 2007),
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2007/wp07l5.pdf (conducting an empirical study of subprime
mortgage borrowers and finding indirect support for the put option theory because "homeowners who
have suffered a 20 percent or greater fall in house prices are about fourteen times more likely to default
on a mortgage as compared to homeowners who have enjoyed a 20 percent increase"); Julapa Jagtiani &
William W. Lang, Strategic Default on First and Second Lien Mortgages During the FinancialCrisis
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Working Paper No. 11-3, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract-1724947
(finding empirical support for the put option theory but noting that many homeowners did not default on
second liens, particularly home equity lines of credit); Thomas Schelkle, Mortgage Default During the
U.S. Mortgage Crisis (Job Market Paper, Sept. 16, 2013) (concluding that the double-trigger model is
better supported by empirical data), http://typo3-8442.rrz.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wisofak/cmr/pdf/Sche
lkle Publication List/MD.pdf; see also Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential
Mortgage Default: Evidencefrom U.S. States, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3139 (2011) (finding that differences
in state recourse laws have a significant effect on mortgage default among negative equity borrowers);
Neil Bhutta et al., The Depth of Negative Equity and Mortgage Default Decisions (Fed. Reserve Bd.
Working Paper No. 2010-35, 2010), http://ssm.com/abstract-1 895493.
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economic incentives. An individual borrower with a 3% down payment is more
likely to default than a borrower with a 20% down payment if home prices fall
15%. Since foreclosure typically leads to a fire sale at a depressed price, one
borrower's default and foreclosure can lead to a cascading cycle of falling
prices and default by additional low-equity homeowners. The systemic
implications of a high number of borrowers having low levels of home equity
are simply not addressed by the ability-to-repay or qualified mortgage
standards.
B. QualifiedResidential Mortgages and Minimum Down Payments

The Dodd-Frank Act also established a second regulatory framework for
mortgage lending, which contains an admirable-but somewhat misguidedattempt to address the danger posed by low-equity borrowing. Somewhat
confusingly termed "qualified residential mortgages," this standard has only the
slightest connection to the "qualified mortgage" framework discussed
previously: the statute specifies that regulators' definition of "qualified
residential mortgage" shall be "no broader" than the definition of "qualified
mortgage".,42 Indeed, under rules proposed in April 2011 by six federal
agencies, the definition of a "qualified residential mortgage" (QRM) is
identical to that of a "qualified mortgage" (QM), but contains additional
restrictions.43 But there are two fundamental differences between the two
regimes that demonstrate the shortcomings of the current regulatory approach
with respect to low-equity clustering.
The QRM definition arises in the very different context of credit risk
retention by mortgage securitizers. The Dodd-Frank Act added section 15G to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which directs federal agencies to
promulgate regulations requiring "any securitizer to retain an economic interest
in a portion of the credit risk for any residential mortgage asset that the
securitizer, through the issuance of an asset-backed security, transfers, sells, or
conveys to a third party."44 Specifically, the statute mandates that the
regulations "require a securitizer to retain not less than 5 percent of the credit
risk for any asset that is not a qualified residential mortgage that is transferred,
sold, or conveyed through the issuance of an asset-backed security by the
securitizer."45 The securitizer must retain 5% of the credit risk "if 1 or more of
the assets that collateralize the asset-backed security are not qualified
residential mortgages," even if the remainder of the collateral consists of QRM
loans.4

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
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The consequences of originating a non-QRM loan thus differ from those
of originating a non-QM loan.47 Under section 129C of the Truth-in-Lending
Act, a lender may freely originate non-QM loans as long as the ability-to-repay
requirement is met.48 This means that if a lender chooses to originate a non-QM
loan, it need only be able to demonstrate that it considered the borrower's credit
history, income, employment status, etc. 49 and performed the requisite income
verification.so On the other hand, originating a non-QRM loan forces a
securitizer to retain 5% of the credit risk of that loan. As the securitization
market drives the demand for mortgage origination, this direct financial penalty
will render non-QRM loans more expensive and less prevalent.
The stronger incentive provided by the QRM standard reinforces the
importance of its primary substantive difference from the QM definition. Under
the proposed rules, a QRM must have a minimum down payment of 20% and
maximum loan-to-value ratio of 80%.51 Giving lenders a financial incentive to
offer 20% down payment loans would certainly reduce the prevalence of lowequity loans, as long as appraisals are not wildly inflated. But as we discuss
below,52 a high minimum down payment would also impose a heavy burden on
creditworthy borrowers who lack the financial resources to come up with such
a large cash payment. More fundamentally, imposing a minimum down
payment reflects an inadequate approach to addressing the systemic risk posed
by low-equity clustering. The proportion of homeowners left with negative
equity when home prices fall is not only a function of the average down
payment size, which is what the QRM proposal affects. As we explain in the
next Part, the distribution of private contracting terms likely to induce low
levels of equity is equally important.
QRM's strong incentive for lenders not to offer mortgages with less than a
20% down payment reflects a detrimentally narrow focus on reducing risky
contracting. There is always a risk-reward tradeoff: greater risk often implies
greater reward, and the QRM proposal makes no mention of the beneficial
effects of limited amounts of speculation in the housing market. When the

47.
But see discussion of new QRM proposed rule infra note 150.
48.
15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(1) (2012) ("Any creditor with respect to any residential
mortgage loan, and any assignee of such loan subject to liability under this subchapter, may presume that
the loan has met the requirements of subsection (a), if the loan is a qualified mortgage." (emphasis
added)). This indicates that the qualified mortgage standard is merely a presumption of compliance with
the ability-to-repay standard.
49.
Id. § 1639c(a)(3).
50.
Id. § 1639c(a)(4). However, some lenders have pointed out that QM may end up
defining the contours of most mortgage products offered because lenders will wish to avoid any
potential legal liability. See CFPB Considers Protecting Lenders Under Qualified Mortgage Rule,
HOUSINGWIRE (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.housingwire.com/articles.cfpb-considers-protecting-lenders
-under-qualified-mortgage-rule (citing a Compass Point research note concluding that "the QM
rulemaking will largely define the contours of mortgage lending").
51.
Credit Risk Retention Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,124 (Apr. 29, 2011).
For a detailed discussion of the 20% down payment requirement, see infra Section III.C.
52.
See discussion infra Section III.C.
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economy is mired in a recession or even a temporary slowdown, erecting
artificial barriers to credit-such as a 20% minimum down payment
requirement-can needlessly reduce liquidity and cripple demand. The
overbroad down payment requirement in the proposed QRM standard is simply
not narrowly tailored to the goal of reducing systemic risk.
Indeed, a regulatory paradigm that focuses on the distribution of privately
contracted terms permits calibrating the precise level of risky terms that would
be socially optimal. For example, through a system such as the leverage
licensing regime we propose below,54 regulators could permit 2% of new
mortgages to have a very low down payment, which would bring society the
benefits of a low quantity of risky contracting without the costs of too much.
And of course, regulating the distribution of contract terms permits raising the
mean (or median) level of equity as well. Regulators could simply license 51%
of new mortgages at a 20% down payment level and thereby ensure that on
average new mortgages would remain low-risk from an initial equity
standpoint.
In short, QM and QRM both reflect an overly narrow regulatory paradigm
of prohibiting risky contract terms rather than considering the distribution of
those terms in the borrower population. In particular, the regulatory response to
the crisis has not adequately considered the aggregate effect of low-equity
clustering among the borrower population when home prices drop and liquidity
dries up. The next Part will show that the housing crisis beginning in 2007 was
preceded by a high concentration of low levels of equity, which amplified the
harm caused by falling home prices by pushing a larger cohort of borrowers
underwater. As this leads to higher levels of default and foreclosures, reducing
home prices even further, low-equity clustering contributes directly to systemic
risk in the housing market.
II. The Economic Effect of Low-Equity Clustering
One factor affecting the overall stability of the housing market is the
system-wide distribution of home equity. Average equity levels are
undoubtedly important: a population with greater home equity on average
would have fewer homeowners below the zero-percent level when housing
prices fall. Yet the distribution of equity levels is also crucial: if more
homeowners are tightly clustered together at a low level of equity, a drop in
housing prices beyond this level pushes proportionately more homeowners into
negative equity than if borrowers are spread evenly across the equity spectrum.
As increased default can lead to a cycle of falling housing prices through

53.
Put differently, where the marginal benefit of a certain quantity of risky terms is
equal to its marginal cost.
54. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
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foreclosures and short sales, low-equity clustering represents a form of
systemic risk to the housing market.5
Mechanisms that prevent low-equity clustering can be likened to flood
levies that provide multiple layers of protection in the event of a disaster. Each
additional level of home equity provides an additional safeguard. For example,
if all of the homeowners in a given population are clustered around the 5%
equity level, a drop in home values of 10% pushes every homeowner in the
population into negative equity. However, if half of the population held 15%
equity loans (and the remainder held 5% equity), that half would remain in
positive equity even if home values dropped by 10%. Similarly, if 1/3 of the
population were at the 5% equity level, 1/3 at the 12% level, and 1/3 at the 15%
level, even fewer homeowners would be facing negative equity in the scenario
where home prices dropped by 10%. This simple example illustrates that
increased distribution of home equity reduces the danger from low-equity
clustering. Indeed, since the exact drop in home prices is unknown in advance,
it might seem prudent to encourage an even and smooth distribution of equity
so as to minimize the number of homeowners who would be pushed into
negative equity with any decrease in home prices. In terms of flood levies, one
might argue that more levies are better because they provide redundant
protection.
However, such an approach carries its own risks. In particular, equity that
is spaced too smoothly can lead to a "domino effect" in which one small drop
in prices triggers a cascading cycle of default and decreasing prices. For
example, a drop in prices of 2% would push homeowners at the 1%equity level
into negative equity and subsequent default. Even if the resulting foreclosure or
distressed sale only further depressed prices by 1%, that would push
homeowners at the 2% equity level into negative equity and subsequent default.
This cascading cycle of dropping prices and default would expose the housing
market to a much higher level of systemic risk than the scenario in which
homeowners were clustered at the 10% level. Indeed, in this example, no
homeowner would be pushed into negative equity in the clustering scenario,
whereas a smooth distribution of equity could expose every homeowner located
along the cascading chain of falling prices to negative equity and subsequent
default.
Admittedly, this scenario of cascading default might seem unrealistic in
light of the economic research that shows that homeowners do not necessarily
default in response to very small levels of negative equity. Moreover, the
requisite liquidity shocks might not be present in cases where exogenous

55.
Reducing low-equity clustering also has informational benefits in addition to
reducing systemic risk. Greater diversity in the distribution of equity provides a "miner's canary," an
early warning system that something is wrong without triggering the cascading effect of foreclosures
leading to prices falling further. We discuss these informational benefits in detail in Ian Ayres & Joshua
Mitts, Anti-Herding Regulation (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
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factors lead to only a minor drop in home prices. As substantial decreases in
home values often result from asset bubbles whose popping leads to increased
credit constraints, the more typical scenario would see drops in home values on
the order of 10-15% rather than 1%. Nonetheless, the concern of a domino
effect is present even at higher levels of home equity: a drop in prices by 10%
might trigger a cascading cycle of falling prices at the 9% equity level,
followed by 10%, 11%, etc. Thus, when considering mechanisms to reduce
low-equity clustering, it might be beneficial to consider "circuit breakers"empty ranges of equity levels that could absorb small decreases in prices by
keeping homeowners above the range in positive equity. For example, in the
case where home prices fall by 10%, a gap in equity between 10-12% would
ensure that any subsequent drops in home values from 10% to 11% would not
lead to a further drop from 11% to 12%. Indeed, the regulatory regime
proposed in this Article includes a monitoring component that enables
maintaining these "circuit breakers" alongside a non-clustered distribution of
mortgage leverage. 56
This discussion is not merely hypothetical, for the effect of low-equity
clustering is ultimately an empirical question. In Section II.A, we summarize
existing empirical research that suggests that certain mortgage terms and equity
extractions preceded the housing crisis. In Section II.B, we present the results
of an original empirical study we conducted, which are consistent with the
hypothesis that more concentrated levels of equity led to greater declines in
home prices and higher levels of mortgage default during the crisis period.
A. ExistingResearch on Low-Equity Clustering

To demonstrate the importance of regulating the distribution of home
equity, this Section presents empirical studies of the impact of low-equity
clustering on home prices and default over the past decade.57 One recent study
by Bostic et al. shows that the prevalence of risky mortgage terms rose
dramatically during the housing bubble, as indicated in the table below, which
contains a breakdown of home mortgages in 1999, 2003, and 2006 :

56.
See discussion infra Subsection IV.A.3.
57.
We define equity as the difference between the purchase price of the home and the
mortgage principal balance, which typically includes closing costs as well.
58.
Raphael W. Bostic et al., Mortgage Product Substitution and State Anti-Predatory
Lending Laws. Better Loans and Better Borrowers? (U. Penn Inst. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 0927, 2012), http://ssm.com/abstracy=1460871. The following tables, maps, and headings are directly
excerpted from this research paper.
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59
Table 1: Selected Sample Statistics, 1999, 2003, and 2006 (All Loans)
2006
2003
1999
3,251,355
1,840,040
596,710
Number of Loans (All Loans)
22.31%
5.21%
0.20%
Interest-Only Loans
25.01%
5.07%
11.56%
Balloon Loans
11.41%
0.00%
0.20%
Balloon ARM Loans
50.43%
19.66%
28.92%
ARM Teaser Loans
$ 200,990
$ 165,755
$ 96,092
Average Loan Amount
54.26%
58.43%
51.47%
Loans With Prepayment Penalty

The dramatic rise in interest-only loans, balloon loans, and ARM teaser
loans directly contributed to low-equity clustering. This may be seen in the
following maps excerpted from the Bostic et al. study:
Figure 1: 1999 - Percent of All Loans - Interest-Only60

lop

59.
60.

2

%ta 25%

Id. at 29. The loan quantities have been transformed into percentages.
Id. at 40.
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Figure 2: 2006 - Percent of All Loans - Interest-Only61
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In these maps showing the proportion of interest-only loan originations in
1999 and 2006, one can quickly see these terms were concentrated in California
and a few select non-California counties where more than 25% of
originations-and at times more than 50% of originations-were made on an
interest-only basis.
Figure 3: 1999 - Percent of All Loans - Balloon 62
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Figure 4: 2006 - Percent of All Loans - Balloon 63
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An analogous pattern can be seen in this pair of maps showing the
increased prevalence and concentration of mortgage originations with balloon
payment conditions.
Finally, the following figure taken from the study shows the nearly
universal dominance of teaser rates in the 2006 market, as more than 75% of
the originations in virtually all counties were teaser ARM loans:
Figure 5: 2006 - Percent of Adjustable Rate Loans with a Teaser64
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Other studies have directly examined the role of equity stripping in the
housing bubble of the mid-2000s. The following estimates by former Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy demonstrate the
dramatic rise of equity extraction:
Figure 6: Sources of Free Cash Generated by Equity Extraction65
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Figure 6 shows that equity extractions rose dramatically over the prior
decade, rarely topping $100 billion in the years 1991-2000 yet skyrocketing to
approximately $400 billion in 2005.66 Surveys of cashout refinance borrowers
suggest that a substantial proportion of funds converted to cash were used for
personal consumption expenditures (including vacations).67 These findings are
consistent with evidence that homeowners utilized home equity loans to finance
discretionary spending.68
In a study that strongly supports this paper's thesis, Amir E. Khandani,
Andrew W. Lo, and Robert C. Merton estimated the extent to which "equity
extractions" in the years leading up to the housing crisis led to an
"unintentional synchronization of leverage" that increased the correlation of

65.
This figure and the following graph and heading are excerpted from Alan
Greenspan & James Kennedy, Sources and Uses of Equity Extractedfrom Homes, 24 OXFORD REV.
EcoN. POL'Y 120, 125 (2008).
66.
Id.
67.
Id. at 126. For an example found in a news story at the height of the bubble, see
Michael Rubinkam, Home Equity Used to Finance Super Bowl Trips, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 2, 2005,

http://www.chron.com/business/article/Home-equity-used-to-finance-Super-Bowl-trips-1660034.php.
68.
E.g., Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and
the U.S. Household Leverage Crisis, 101 AM. ECON. REv. 2132, 2152 (2011) (finding that "a large
fraction of home equity-based borrowing is used for consumption or home improvement").
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mortgage default among homeowners.69 An equity extraction occurs when a
homeowner obtains a "cash-out" refinancing loan or home equity loan, or sells
his or her home and obtains a new mortgage with a higher loan-to-value ratio,
retaining the proceeds from the sale as cash. 70 Khandani et al. explain the "selfsynchronizing ratchet effect," which renders low-equity clustering such a
potent source of systemic risk:
[R]efinancing-related increases in leverage cannot be symmetrically reduced
when property values decline because homes are indivisible . . .. Once property
values decline, a wave of defaults becomes unavoidable because mortgage
lenders have no mechanism such as a margin call to compel homeowners to add
more equity to maintain their leverage ratio, nor can homeowners reduce their
leverage in incremental steps by selling a portion of their homes and using the
proceeds to reduce their debt. This self-synchronizing "ratchet effect" of the
refinancing market can create significant systemic risk in an otherwise
geographically and temporally diverse pool of mortgages, steadily increasing the
aggregate leverage of the housing market until it reaches a systemically critical
threshold.71

Indeed, this is what fundamentally distinguishes mortgage leverage
synchronization from similar synchronization in liquid securities: unlike with
stocks or bonds in an investment portfolio, a homeowner cannot sell a portion
of his or her physical home to reduce leverage.72 Greater leverage
synchronization thus increases systemic risk because a drop in home prices
leads to highly correlated set of defaults among homeowners clustered at low
levels of equity. 73
Khandani et al. provide empirical support for the ratchet effect by using
data regarding accumulated equity in mid-2006, once housing prices began to
fall, to simulate the expected level of negative equity at the end of 2008.74 In
their simulation, "approximately 18% of all mortgage loans exhibit negative
equity as of December 2008, which is nearly identical to the actual figure
reported by industry sources."75 The simulated incidence of negative equity for
that period without equity extractions is 3%, meaning that the refinancing
ratchet effect caused 15% of mortgages to have negative equity in the

69.

Amir E. Khandani et al., Systemic Risk and the Refinancing Ratchet Effect 3 (Nat'l

Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 15362, 2009); see also Greenspan & Kennedy, supra note
65 (estimating equity extractions from 1991-2006).
70. See Greenspan & Kennedy, supra note 65, at 122; Alan Greenspan & James
Kennedy, Estimates of Home Mortgage Originations, Repayments, and Debt on One-to-Four-Family

Residences 5-6 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series No. 2005-41, 2005).
71.
Khandani et al., supra note 69, at 2.
72. See id. at 2.
73.
74.
75.

Cf id. at 3.
See id. at4.
Id.
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simulation. 76 Accordingly, low-equity clustering through cash-out refinancing
made a substantial contribution to systemic risk in the housing market by
placing more owners at risk of falling into negative equity.
B. An OriginalEmpiricalStudy on Low-Equity Clustering

As an additional demonstration of the contribution of low-equity
clustering, we conducted an empirical study that examined home equity levels
of over 20,000 homeowners across eleven states from 1999 to 2011. Our results
found that higher levels of low-equity clustering correlate with increased
mortgage delinquency even after controlling for macroeconomic shocks. While
imperfections in the data preclude establishing strong causal explanations, the
results nonetheless serve as heuristic evidence of the need to attend to the
problem of low-equity clustering.
1. Research Design
When conducting this study, we set out to examine the impact of lowequity clustering on home prices and mortgage default. As falling home prices
and increased default feed each other in a cascading cycle, we measure the
effect of low-equity clustering on each independently. We examine these two
variables on a quarterly basis from the first quarter of 1999 to the first quarter
of 2011 across eleven highly populated states: Arizona, California, Florida,
Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Texas.77 State-level quarterly home price data were obtained from the Federal
State-level quarterly mortgage
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
delinquency rates were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York.79
Data on home equity levels were derived from the U.S. Department of
Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey, a quarterly
survey of consumers on household income and expenditures. The survey asks

Id.
76.
These states and years were selected because data on mortgage default were freely
77.
available from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for these states and years alone. See Quarterly
Report on Household Debt and Credit, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. 22 (2011),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/nationaleconomy/householdcredit/DistrictReporQ32011.xlsx.
78.
These data may be found at DownloadableHPI Data,FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY,
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=87 (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). The study utilized the data
through 2011Q3 from the dataset entitled "States through 2013Q4 (Not Seasonally Adjusted)" under
"All-Transactions Indexes (Estimated using Sales Prices and Appraisal Data)."
79. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 77, at 22 (showing the state-level data
as "Percent of Mortgage Debt 90+ Days Late by State").
Consumer Expenditure Survey, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR
80.
STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/cex (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). For a detailed description of how the
survey is conducted, see Consumer Expenditures andIncome, in BLS HANDBOOK OF METHODS (2013),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/homchl6.pdf.
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homeowners to state their outstanding mortgage principal balance for each
month as well as the estimated current value of their home. We divided the
monthly principal balances by the estimated home value to produce a monthly
equity level, which we averaged to produce a quarterly equity level for each
homeowner. While homeowners' estimates of the value of their own homes
may be imprecise and may even systematically understate or overstate house
values, these estimates will be sufficient for our purposes so long as they are
correlated with homes' true values and any bias is orthogonal to the degree of
leverage (and other potential influences on market behavior).
We estimate the prevalence of low-equity clustering in several ways. First,
we compute the standard deviation of home equity levels in each state-quarter.
The standard deviation can serve as a useful measure of the dispersion of the
data in general: the lower the standard deviation, the more the data are clustered
around their mean. Of course, for the standard deviation to be useful for
measuring low-equity clustering, it is essential to measure the mean as well.
The study thus computed the mean of home equity levels in each state-quarter.
When taken together, the mean and standard deviation of equity levels provide
a useful picture of the degree of low-equity clustering. In addition, as an
alternative measure of low-equity clustering, the proportion of homeowners
with less than 20% equity was computed by dividing the number of
homeowners with less than 20% equity by the number of homeowners with
mortgages in each state-quarter.
Finally, we obtained the state-level seasonally adjusted unemployment
rates from the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics.82 The
unemployment rate reflects crisis conditions at the macroeconomic level and

81.
At a technical level, this computation was conducted as follows. First, the microdata
for each year in the Consumer Expenditure Survey dataset were downloaded. (The following
column/table names refer to the CES microdata.) Next, the monthly mortgage principal balances were
extracted from the "QBLNCMI," "QBLNCM2," and QBLNCM3" columns in the "MOR" table.
Property values were obtained from the "PROPVALX" column in the "OPI" table by matching the
"NEWID" and "PROPNO" columns from the "MOR" table with the same columns in the "OPI" table.
Finally, the geographic state of the consumer was obtained by matching the "NEWID" column in the
"MOR" table with the "NEWID" column in the "FML" quarterly tables, which contain biographical
information on the consumer unit. An objection might be raised that it is inaccurate to compute average
quarterly equity based on the estimated property value at the time the survey is completed because that
estimate occurs at the end of the quarter when the survey is taken. Admittedly, this estimation lacks
sufficient specificity to capture precise intra-quarter equity levels, e.g., on a month-by-month basis.
However, it seems to be the best available alternative. Using solely the third-month principal balance in
the equity computer would arguably lead to a greater distortion because it would omit any intra-quarter
change in principal, which might be much more substantial. For example, a homeowner might refinance
into a lower-equity loan in the second month, leading to a higher principal balance in the third month. In
such a scenario, it would be inaccurate to utilize an equity level reflecting the third month alone because
the prior two months of the quarter had a lower principal level. This increased leverage should be
weighted appropriately as one third of the quarter, not 100%.
82.
Local Area Unemployment Statistics, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/lau (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
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can thus function as a general proxy for income and liquidity shocks.83 Of
course, this proxy is imperfect. In light of the depth and breadth of the financial
crisis of 2008, conditions were likely so vastly different during this period that
it is necessary to consider those quarters separately. Accordingly, a crisisperiod dummy variable was set as I beginning in the third quarter of 2007,
which is when the uptick in unemployment begins, coinciding with tightening
credit conditions as a result of the subprime mortgage and ensuing financial
cTisis.
2. Econometric Model and Regression Results
Our core interest is to test whether states with greater low-equity
clustering experienced greater declines in housing prices and greater defaults.
The regressions utilized in the study employ the following econometric model
for panel data with a one-way error component and state fixed effects :
yjt=a+X'ift+p;+vy,i=,.

Nt

1..T

with:
i= states
t = quarters

X'i, = itth observation on K explanatory variables

6= K x 1 (coefficient matrix)

p= fixed parameters for each state (dummies)
vit= i.i.d. stochastic remainder disturbances.
We begin by looking at the impact of pre-crisis low-equity clustering on
post-crisis price falls and default rates. Controlling for other factors, including
mean pre-crisis equity, we want to test whether states with lower standard
deviations in equity experienced larger price drops and higher default rates. The
regression uses the FHFA Drop in Home Prices and FHFA Rise in Home
Prices variables defined in the statistical appendix, examining the effect of precrisis low-equity clustering on home prices throughout the crisis period. This
regression uses exclusively fixed group-level independent variables. In addition
to the FHFA Rise in Home Prices, three state-level variables are defined: the
standard deviation of equity in the third quarter of 2006, the mean equity in the

83.
Admittedly, the unemployment rate cannot serve as a proxy for income or liquidity
shocks caused by individual, idiosyncratic circumstances such as divorce or illness. Nonetheless, these
years experienced substantial liquidity shocks from rapidly increasing unemployment resulting from
decreased demand and credit constraints. See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note I1, at
389-401.
84. Details of our modeling are included in a statistical appendix. This model is based
on the standard panel data model with a one-way error component and fixed effects found in BADI H.
BALTAGI, EcoONOMETRiC ANALYSIS OF PANEL DATA 12 (2d ed. 2002).
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third quarter of 2006, and the proportion of homeowners with less than 20%
equity in the third quarter of 2006.
The following regressions examine the effect of these variables on falling
home prices during the crisis period. As these contain exclusively fixed terms
86
on the right-hand side, ordinary least squares regression is employed.
Table 2: FHFA Drop in Home Prices & Mean/Standard Deviation of Equity

Standard Deviation of Equity (2006q3)
Mean Equity (2006q3)
FHFA Rise in Home Prices

FHFA Drop in Home Prices
Mean (p) Standard Deviation (a)
(0.175)**
-0.964
(0.197)**
-0.654
(0.085)**
0.613
0.437

Constant Term

(0.101)**

0.33

R2

165

N
*p<0.0 5; **p<0.01

Table 3: FHFA Drop in Home Prices & Proportion of Homeowners Less
Than 20% Equity
FHFA Drop in Home Prices
it a
0.381 (0.180)*
Proportion of Homeowners <20% Equity (2006q3)
0.493 (0.082)**
FHFA Rise in Home Prices
-0.194 (0.072)**
Constant Term

0.22

R2

165

N
*p<0.05; **p<0.0I

As expected, a lower pre-crisis mean and standard deviation of equity lead
to a greater drop in home prices. Similarly, a greater proportion of homeowners
with less than 20% equity correlated with a greater drop in home prices. These
findings support the conclusion that low-equity clustering increases systemic
risk by leading to falling home prices, which push more homeowners into
negative equity and subsequent default.

The third quarter of 2006 was chosen because it is the period immediately
85.
preceding the peak of the home prices from which the drop in home prices was calculated. It is thus
arguably representative of the bubble before shifting market conditions started changing the distribution
of equity.
86.
There is no need to control for heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, or crosssectional dependence because there is no right-hand side variation. Essentially, these regressions
compare the varying state-specific levels of mean, standard deviation, and proportion of homeowners
under 20% equity for the movement in each state-quarter's default rate independently, which works fine
with constant terms on the right-hand side.

101

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 31, 2014

Using the default rate as our dependent variable produces similar results.
In light of the constant nature of the independent variables, it is necessary to
control for the state-level variation in the size of the housing bubble (rise in
prices), as this would affect the severity of the increase in the default rate in
each state. Below are the results of these ordinary least square regressions,
which examine the effect of the mean, standard deviation, and proportion of
homeowners with less than 20% equity on the default rate during the crisis
period:
Table 4: Default Rate & Mean/Standard Deviation of Equity
Default Rate
Standard Deviation of Equity (2006q3)
Mean Equity (2006q3)
FHFA Rise in Home Prices
Constant Term

R

2

-0.144
-0.195
0.176

(0.066)*
(0.074)**
(0.032)**

0.121

(0.038)**

0.19

N

165
*p<0.0 5 ; **p<0.01

Table 5: Default Rate & Proportion of Homeowners Less Than 20% Equity
Default Rate
Proportion of Homeowners Under 20% Equity (2006q3)
FHFA Rise in Home Prices
Constant Term

R2

0.248
0.189
-0.071

(0.062)**
(0.028)**
(0.025)**

0.22

N

165
*p<0.05; **p<0.01

As expected, a lower mean and standard deviation of equity leads to a
higher default rate. Similarly, a greater proportion of homeowners with less
than 20% equity correlates with a higher default rate. Along with the previous
regression results, these data support the conclusion that low-equity clustering
increases systemic risk by leading to higher levels of mortgage default.
3. Home Price Regressions
To further strengthen the argument that low-equity clustering increases
the likelihood of default, it is helpful to consider its effect on home prices. As
described above, falling home prices are an essential link in the chain of events
leading to increased default: as home prices fall, low-equity clustering leads to
more homeowners being pushed into negative equity and subsequent default
upon experiencing a liquidity shock. Accordingly, establishing a link between
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low-equity clustering and falling home prices would provide additional support
for the argument that low-equity clustering increases systemic risk.
The following two regressions employ the same independent variables as
above, but define a different dependent variable and a new independent
variable.87 The rationale behind these two variables is that in order to capture
the effect of low-equity clustering on falling home prices, it is necessary to
measure the drop in home prices from their pre-crisis peak to each quarter
employed in the time-series regression. Accordingly, the fhfadrop variable was
defined as the difference between each state's home price index in the fourth
quarter of 2006 and in the current quarter. As different states might have had
larger "bubbles" in home values than others, the fhfarise variable was defined
as the difference between this pre-crisis peak and the initial home price index in
the first quarter of 1991. By controlling for the rise in home values, a regression
examining the drop in home prices can focus exclusively on the variables
responsible for relatively greater decreases across states.
Of course, as the aforementioned definitions imply, in order to compare
larger home price bubbles across states, it is necessary to remove the fixed
effects constraint. These regressions thus examine not only whether variables
such as the standard deviation of equity, mean equity, and the proportion of
homeowners with less than 20% equity explain the variation of home prices
within a state, but also whether they explain differences in decreasing home
prices across states in light of different state-specific increases in prices. 89
Below are the results of the two regressions, one utilizing the standard deviation of equity and mean equity, and the other utilizing the proportion of
homeowners with less than 20% equity.90 Each examines the effect of these

87.
The two variables are defined as follows, where fhfaindex is the FHFA Home Price
Index for the state-quarter:
fhfadrops,,quar,, = [fhfaindexs 0a, 2006q4 - fhfaindexst,, quarte] / thfaindexW,,sa, 2006q4
fhfarise,,,qur, = [fhfaindexstat 2006q4- fifaindexst,,, 1999ql] / fhfaindexs,, 1999qi.
88.
The fourth quarter of 2006 was the quarter containing the highest aggregate FHFA
home price index (sum total of FHFA index for each state) in the dataset. This was utilized to ensure an
appropriate comparison across states, even if their state-specific highest home price index value might
have been in one of the surrounding quarters.
89.
While there is no theoretical explanation for why factors affecting the default rate
should vary across states, there is a strong reason why the extent of the decrease in home prices would
indeed vary across states. The decrease in home prices depends on their rise up to that point, which
plainly varies across states. On the other hand, changes in the default rate within a given state should
depend on the distribution of equity within that state, and there is no theory for why these variables
(standard deviation, mean, and proportion of homeowners under 20% equity) would necessarily vary
across states. Put differently, a variable measuring the drop in home prices necessarily implies a random
effects model, whereas a variable measuring simply the rate of default in a given region can be
examined under a fixed-effects framework in the absence of a theoretical justification for between-group
variation. For a further discussion of the difference between fixed and random effects, see BALTAGI,
supra note 84, at 12-20.
90.
As with the first two regressions, these utilize panel-corrected standard errors to
control for heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and cross-sectional dependence. Just as with the default
rate, these phenomena would be present when examining the effect of low-equity clustering on home

103

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 31, 2014

variables on the drop in home prices, controlling for their rise, during the crisis
period. There is no lag employed, because unlike the default rate, which
measures the incidence of loans with 90-plus days of nonpayment, the effect of
low-equity clustering on falling home prices does not have any inherent delay.
Table 6: FHFA Drop in Home Prices & Mean/Standard Deviation of Equity,
Time-Series
FHFA Drop in Home Prices
Standard Deviationof Equity
Mean Equity
Unemployment Rate
FHFA Rise in Home Prices
Constant Term

-0.249
-0.695
1.368
0.595
0.115

R2

0.810
165

N

(0.077)**
(0.099)**
(0.429)**
(0.054)**
(0.058)*

*p<0.0 5;**p<0.01
Table 7: FHFA Drop in Home Prices & Proportion of Homeowners Less
Than 20% Equity, Time-Series
FHFA Drop in Home Prices
Proportion of Homeowners Under 20% Equity
Unemployment Rate
FHFA Rise in Home Prices
Constant Term

R2

0.474
1.193
0.480
-0.339

(0.086)**
(0.393)**
(0.063)**
(0.042)**

0.59

N

165
*p<0. 0 5; **p<0.01

prices as well. Moreover, tests in Stata confirm that each is present. Below is the test for
heteroskedasticity (xttest3):
HO: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
chi2 (11) = 319.38
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Serial correlation (xtserial):
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data:
HO: no first-order autocorrelation
F(1, 10) = 242.638

Prob > F 0.0000
Cross-sectional dependence (xttest2) (correlation matrix omitted) ...
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence:
chi2(55) = 202.262, Pr = 0.0000
Based on 15 complete observations over panel units.

104

The Distribution of Home Equity
As expected, lower standard deviation of equity and mean equity have a
statistically significant, positive effect on the drop in home prices. Greater lowequity clustering leads to a greater decrease in home prices, which in turn leads
to higher levels of mortgage default as shown in the prior regressions.
Similarly, as an alternative measurement of low-equity clustering, a higher
proportion of homeowners under 20% equity leads to a higher drop in home
prices. The relevance of low-equity clustering is thus supported by home price
data as well.
4. Default Rate Regressions
This regression examines the effect of low-equity clustering on the default
rate by measuring the extent to which variation in the standard deviation and
mean levels of equity explain variation in the mortgage default rate during the
crisis period alone (third quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2011). As the
default rate reflects the proportion of homeowners who are ninety-plus days
delinquent in their mortgage payments, the study employs a two-quarter lag for
the standard deviation and mean levels of equity. The decision to default would
have occurred at least two quarters prior to the time at which such a decision
would be reflected in the default rate. However, the regression employs only a
one period lag for the unemployment rate, because the liquidity shock that
would lead a homeowner to default would require approximately one quarter
before being reflected in the unemployment rate proxy.
The results of the regression are as follows92

91.
This follows from the definition of unemployment as actively looking for work
within the last four weeks, utilized by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. How the Government Measures
Unemployment, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cps htgm.htm#unemployed
(last visited Feb. 14, 2014) ("Persons are classified as unemployed if they do not have a job, have
actively looked for work in the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for work."). Accordingly, a
liquidity shock from a job loss would have likely occurred in the quarter prior to the quarter in which it
would be reflected in the unemployment rate. As it is necessary to examine the distribution of leverage
as of the quarter prior to when the shock would be reflected in the unemployment rate, it is appropriate
to use a one-period lag for unemployment because a two-period lag is used for measuring the
distribution of leverage.
92.
The state-level dummies used for a fixed effects model have been omitted from the
results.
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Table 8: Default Rate & Mean/Standard Deviation of Equity, Time-Series
Default Rate
Standard Deviation of Equity (two-period lag)
Mean Equity (two-period lag)
Unemployment Rate (one-period lag)
Constant Term

-0.068
-0.163
0.832
0.114

(0.028)*
(0.040)**
(0.087)**
(0.028)**

0.71
165

R2

N
*p<0.0 5 ; **p<0.01

As expected, states with lower mean equity were estimated to have
statistically higher rates of default. Moreover, as predicted by our foregoing
analysis, both the standard deviation of equity levels and their mean have a
statistically significant effect on the default rate. The statistically significant
negative coefficients estimated for both the mean and standard deviation of
equity levels are consistent with our prediction that lower levels of overall
equity that are tightly clustered together lead to higher rates of default. The
coefficient for mean equity is larger than that of standard deviation, which
makes sense: tightly clustered high levels of equity would not lead to default.
Nonetheless, the statistically significant negative coefficients for standard
deviation and mean equity suggest that low-equity clustering is an important
predictor of the default rate.
An alternative regression measures the association between the proportion
of homeowners with less than 20% equity and the default rate during the crisis
period. This is another way to measure low-equity clustering because it reflects
the greater concentration of homeowners at a relatively low level of equity.
However, the usefulness of this measurement is limited because unlike the
standard deviation, the proportion alone implies nothing as to the distribution of
such equity within this less-than-20% bin. Moreover, its causal significance is
unclear: it might merely reflect declining home prices over time rather than
represent a true predictor of increased default. Yet it can serve as a heuristic
demonstration of the association between one form of low-equity clustering and
the default rate.
The results of this regression are as follows:
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Table 9: Default Rate & Proportion of Homeowners Less Than 20% Equity,
Time-Series
Default Rate
Proportion of Homeowners <20% Equity (two-period lag) 0.105
0.883
Unemployment Rate (one-period lag)
-0.013
Constant Term

R2

(0.033)**
(0. 118)**
(0.014)

0.57

165
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
As expected, the proportion of homeowners with less than 20% equity has
a statistically significant association with the default rate, even after controlling
for unemployment. Its coefficient is positive, implying that a having higher
proportion of homeowners in this low-equity bin leads to an increase in the
default rate. As with the prior regression, this is a fixed effects model
measuring within-group variation, and the state-level individual dummies have
been omitted.
To summarize, notwithstanding the associational nature of this statistical
analysis, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that low-equity
clustering is correlated with greater declines in housing prices and higher levels
of mortgage default. Along with the studies surveyed in Section II.A, these
empirical results suggest that low-equity clustering has a detrimental effect in
times of crisis. In the following Part, we propose reforms to promote greater
diversity in the distribution of home equity.
N

III. Reforms to Promote Greater Diversity in the Distribution of Home Equity
As suggested by theory and the above empirical results, low-equity
clustering increases systemic risk in the housing market. Surprisingly, current
policies such as the mortgage interest tax deduction and Federal Housing
Authority (FHA) loans actually encourage low-equity clustering. In this Part,
we critique these policies and suggest two distinct reforms to promote greater
diversity in the distribution of home equity and improve the stability of the
housing market: reforming the mortgage interest tax deduction and improving
the Dodd-Frank Qualified Residential Mortgage definition. In the next Part, we
discuss direct macroprudential regulation of the distribution of home equity.
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A. CurrentPolicies IncreaseLow-Equity Clustering

1. The Mortgage Interest Tax Deduction
Much academic commentary has called for the repeal of the mortgage
interest tax deduction. 93 Critics have focused on the deduction's fundamental
failure to promote homeownership, 94 its regressive nature and non-utilization
by taxpayers who could truly benefit from it,9 5 and its tendency to artificially
inflate housing prices.96 More recent scholarship has emphasized that the credit
may produce negative macroeconomic effects by incentivizing higher loan-tovalue ratios. 97 Through this lens, we can see that the synchronized clustering of
homeowners in homes with low equity percentages is not merely the byproduct of independent action but is at least in part a predictable result of tax
policy.
Under 26 U.S.C. Section 163(h), taxpayers may deduct interest paid on a
mortgage utilized to acquire a home or secure a home equity loan. While the
deduction is subject to a limit of a total mortgage balance of $1,000,000 on
acquisition debt and $100,000 on home equity debt, there is no cap on the
deduction nor is the taxpayer limited to claiming it for only one home. Up to
two residences may be included, making the mortgage interest deduction a
particularly powerful incentive to acquire housing with debt. The mortgage
interest deduction is skewed to favor higher-income taxpayers, both because

93.
E.g., Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie:The Hidden Costs
of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347 (2000) (calling for repeal of the
mortgage interest deduction because of its tendency to encourage urban sprawl and deleterious effects
on urban cities); Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax DollarsSpent Inflating the Housing Bubble: How
and Why the Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 751, 754 (2012)
(calling for the repeal of the mortgage interest deduction as ineffective and contributing to overpriced
housing as well as systemic instability); William G. Gale et al., EncouragingHomeownership Through
the Tax Code, TAX NOTES 1171, 1171 (June 18, 2007) (advocating a "tax credit and a subsidized saving
vehicle for first-time home buyers, financed by the elimination of the MID"); see also Edward L.

Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits ofthe Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, in 17 TAX POLICY
AND THE ECONOMY 37, 81 (James M. Poterba ed. 2003) (finding that the mortgage interest deduction's
"impact on the homeownership rate appears to be minimal"); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental
Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 233 (2010) (showing that the mortgage interest deduction lacked an intentional policy purpose).
94.
See Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 93, at 37.
95.

See GEORGE MCCARTHY ET AL., THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND COSTS OF

HOMEOWNERSHIP: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE RESEARCH 3 (2001) (summarizing the literature
and concluding that "[tlax reforms beginning in 1986, however, raised the standard deduction and ...
negated the tax advantages of ownership for most lower- and moderate-income households"); Morrow,
supranote 93, at 760.
96.
See Morrow, supranote 93, at 771-74.
97.
See MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 95, at 38-39 (describing how the mortgage
interest deduction encourages homeowners to maintain high loan-to-value ratios); Morrow, supra note
93, at 775-77.

98.
26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) (2012). Refinancing debt not exceeding the original principal
balance is expressly included within the scope of the deduction. Id. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i)(II).
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deductions are allowed on up two residences, 99 and because the value of the
deduction is higher for high-income taxpayers who face higher marginal tax
rates.loo
Several features of the deduction encourage low-equity clustering. The
value of the deduction increases with the amount of home mortgage interest
paid in a given year. This creates an incentive for borrowers to maximize loanto-value ratios in order to realize the benefit from the deduction. More
precisely, it is rational for borrowers to substitute any other debt for home
mortgage debt as long as the difference between the interest cost of the other
debt and that of the home mortgage debt is less than the net benefit from the
deduction.101 As secured debt, home mortgages generally have lower interest
rates than unsecured debt, suggesting that it will generally be in the borrower's
interest to substitute home mortgage debt for all other debt. 102
Indeed, the potential for the mortgage interest deduction to increase lowequity clustering is supported by the studies on equity extraction during the
recent housing bubble.103 All three methods of extracting equity-cash-out
refinancing, home equity loans, and purchasing a substitute home with a higher
loan-to-value ratiol4could lead to additional deductible interest. In light of
the widespread equity extraction that occurred across the United States in the
run-up to the financial crisis, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that the
mortgage interest deduction played a contributing role in encouraging
homeowners to take on additional mortgage debt and thereby "ratchet up" their
05
leverage to the highest possible level.
One might object to this argument on the grounds that it is overly myopic:
over the long term, homeowners will eventually pay off their mortgages and
thereby reduce the amount of deductible interest. Nonetheless, as currently
constituted, the home mortgage deduction perversely gives larger subsidies to
taxpayers who borrow not only with lower initial equity but also with lower or
no amortization in the future. Mortgagors receive larger deductions if they take
out interest-only loans or if they repeatedly cash out equity in ways that
preserve large interest deductions. Therefore, as currently structured, the home

99.
This can lead to portfolio misallocation. Cf Majorie Flavin & Takashi Yamashita,
Owner-Occupied Housing and the Composition of the Household Portfolio, 92 AM. ECON. REv. 345
(2002) (arguing that homeowners overinvest in housing).
100.
See Morrow, supra note 93, at 758.
101.
Such substitution can also amplify homeowners' natural tendency to overinvest in
housing. Cf Flavin & Yamashita, supranote 99, at 345.
Indeed, while the mortgage interest deduction is limited to refinances equal to or
102.
less than the prior mortgage balance, a borrower may continue to enjoy the benefit of the deduction
through home equity loans or by obtaining a new acquisition loan (by buying a substitute home), which
would be fully deductible up to the $1,000,000 principal limit.
103.
Greenspan & Kennedy, supra note 65; Khandani et al., supra note 69.
104.
See Greenspan & Kennedy, supra note 65, at 122; Greenspan & Kennedy, supra
note 70, at 5-6.
105.
See Khandani et al., supranote 69, at 3.
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mortgage interest deduction gives homeowners an incentive on the margin to
take out terms that increase systemic risk.
2. Government-Insured Mortgages
Another existing policy that fosters low-equity clustering is governmentinsured mortgages such as FHA loans. FHA loans are offered pursuant to
section 203 of the National Housing Act, o0 which empowers the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development to insure mortgages that conform to a set of
statutory criteria, including principal limits and amortization requirements. 107
Most importantly, the statute allows for down payments as low as 3.5%. 108
Moreover, when marketing FHA loans, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development has emphasized that "most of your closing costs and fees can be
included in the loan,"' 0 9 suggesting that the purchaser's initial equity level may
actually be lower than 3.5%.
While the FHA loan program is well known, it is not the only form of
government mortgage insurance that permits extremely low down payments.
Similar programs exist for specific groups of customers and offer even more
generous down payment terms. For example, the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs is authorized by statute to guarantee loans for veterans of up to 100% of
the purchase price.110 The U.S. Department of Agriculture offers loan
guarantees for purchasing rural housing with no down payment required."'

106.
12 U.S.C. § 1709 (2012).
107.
See id. § 1709(b) (establishing eight criteria for eligibility as an insured FHA loan:
(1) lender is approved by the Secretary; (2) loan principal does not exceed certain limitations, generally
115% of the median single-family home price in the area and no more than 100% of the property being
purchased; (3) maximum maturity within thirty to thirty-five years depending on whether insurance was
procured; (4) satisfactory amortization provisions; (5) accrues interest; (6) amortizing payments applied
to both principal and interest; (7) contains other terms conforming to the Secretary's guidelines; and (8)
a minimum down payment of 3.5%).
Id. § 1709(b)(9)(A) ("A mortgage insured under this section shall be executed by a
108.
mortgagor who shall have paid, in cash or its equivalent, on account of the property an amount equal to
not less than 3.5 percent of the appraised value of the property or such larger amount as the Secretary
may determine.").
109.
Let FHA Loans Help You, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/buying/loans (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
110.
See 38 U.S.C. § 3710 (2012) (not providing for any loan-to-value limits); U.S.
DEP'T OF VETERANS

AFFAIRS, LENDERS HANDBOOK -

VA PAMPHLET 26-7,

at ch. 3

§

3,

http://www.benefits.va.gov/warms/pam26 7.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) ("Unlike other home loan
programs, there are no maximum dollar amounts prescribed for VA-guaranteed loans. ... VA limits the
amount of the loan to the reasonable value of the property shown on the NOV plus the cost of energy
efficiency improvements up to $6,000 plus the VA funding fee, with the following exceptions."). The
guarantee provided for VA loans, however, is subject to a relatively tight cap. See 38 U.S.C. §
3703(a)(1)(A)(IV) (2012) (limiting loans above $144,000 to a guarantee of 25% of the loan); 2012 VA
County Loan Limits, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 1, http://www.benefits.va.gov/HOMELOANS/d
ocs/LoanLimits_2012 Dec 201 1.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) ("For all counties other than those
listed below, the 2012 [Loan] Limit is $417,000.").
111.
These so-called "section 502 loans" are authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1472 (2012).
Pursuant to the Department of Agriculture's regulations, loans guaranteed under the program "may be
made for up to 100 percent of the appraised value or the cost of acquisition and any necessary
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Finally, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac offer programs that encourage private
lenders to make low down payment mortgage loans.112 Under the
MyCommunityMortgage program, Fannie Mae purchases single-family
mortgages with up to a 95% loan-to-value ratio with no minimum borrower
contribution. 1 3 Similarly, through the Home Possible Mortgage program,
Freddie Mac offers a product with 95% loan-to-value ratio, and only 5% of the
purchase price is required from borrowers.11 4 We will return to the topic of
beneficial reforms to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Part IV.
Lax lending standards have led to serious solvency concerns for all of the
above entities. Of course, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were large purchasers
of the subprime mortgages that led to the recent financial crisis, which
necessitated their seizure by the Treasury and subsequent government
capitalization."15 Yet serious concerns have also been raised regarding the
solvency of the FHA, as a 2012 audit valued its insurance fund at negative
$13.48 billion.116 A recent analysis places the blame squarely on low-down
payment requirements and the prospect of falling home prices pushing more
owners into negative equity:

development including those purposes in § 1980.310, whichever is less." 7 C.F.R. § 1980.311(b) (2013)
(for new and existing construction, respectively).
112.
Despite having been created and authorized by statute, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac are private companies. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1455(h) (2012) (providing that Freddie Mac "shall
insert appropriate language in all of [its] obligations and securities . . . clearly indicating that such
obligations and securities . . . are not guaranteed by the United States and do not constitute a debt or
obligation of the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof other than [Freddie Mac].").
However, scholars have repeatedly argued that they carry an implied government guarantee because of
their fundamental role in the secondary mortgage markets. See, e.g., W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J.
White, Fussing and Fuming over Fannie and Freddie:How Much Smoke, How Much Fire?, 19 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 159, 164 (2005); David Reiss, The FederalGovernment's Implied Guaranteeof Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac's Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019 (2008).
These arguments were vindicated when the Department of the Treasury seized Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac in September 2008 and announced its willingness to provide up to $200 billion in capital to ensure
stability in the mortgage markets. See James R. Hagerty et al., U.S. Seizes Mortgage Giants, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 8, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122079276849707821.html.
More importantly, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased mortgages at the behest of the U.S.
government to further public policy goals. See Frame & White, supra note 112, at 171-73 (discussing
the ways in which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac further government policy goals of encouraging the
consumption of housing). Their low down payment programs thus reflect government policy, because
Congress could direct Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to cease offering these programs either directly via
statute or as a condition for receiving government funding.
MyCommunityMortgage: Affordable Financing to Serve Low- to Moderate113.
Income Borrowers, FANNIE MAE, http://www.fanniemae.com/content/fact-sheet/mcm-product-matrix
.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
Home Possible: At-a-Glance, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/learn
114.
/pdfs/mp/hp_glance.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 11, at 122-25 (discussing the
115.
numerous purchases by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac of subprime and Alt-A mortgages from 2000-2008
and concluding that "[tihe results would be disastrous for the companies, their shareholders, and
American taxpayers").
Gretchen Morgenson, In an F.H.A. Checkup, a Startling Number, N.Y. TIMES,
116.
Dec. 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/business/in-an-fha-checkup-a-startling-number.html.
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The FHA has burned through its reserves over the past three years as defaults
mount on loans it guaranteed as housing markets deteriorated. FHA-backed
mortgages are an attractive option for borrowers because they can make down
payments as low as 3.5%. But as home prices continue to fall, many of those
borrowers have fallen underwater, where they owe more than their homes are
worth and are at greater risk of default if they experience income shocks." 7

Indeed, a congressional subcommittee recently passed the FHA
Emergency Fiscal Solvency Act designed to strengthen the FHA's cash
reserves." 8 But the possibility of insolvency at the FHA is just an example of
the broader system-wide risk posed by low-equity clustering. FHA loans
facilitate low-equity clustering by making loans to any qualifying borrower at a
fixed down payment of 3.5%. Other government programs offer mortgage
loans with no down payment. These programs directly undermine systemic
stability in the housing market by contributing to low-equity clustering. Some
rightfully object that ending these programs would "choke off credit and send
home prices lower."ll9 Yet the advantage of the licensing approach, which we
will discuss in detail below, is that it is unnecessary to eliminate low down
payment loans entirely. Indeed, recent efforts to raise minimum down payment
levels to 20% cause more harm than good.
B. Reforming the Home Mortgage InterestDeduction

In this and the following Section, we address reforms to reduce low-equity
clustering. This Section describes the possibility of modifying the home
mortgage deduction itself. Instead of incentivizing low, continuing loan-tovalue ratios, the tax code should be revised to encourage amortizing loans. To
qualify for the deduction under our first proposal,120 a mortgage at the time of
origination must satisfy three conditions:
(a) 5% Down Payment Condition: the mortgage must have a
combined loan-to-value ratio of no more than 95%;

117.
Nick Timiraos, Housing Agency's Reserves at Risk, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052970204795304577221222265037002.html.
118.
See Subcommittee Approves Bills Improving Fiscal Health of FHA, Affordable
HousingPrograms, HOUSE COMM. ON FIN. SERV. (Feb. 7, 2012), http://financialservices.house.gov
/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=278489.
119.
See Timiraos, supra note 117 (noting that "many economists" believe this).
120.
Ian Ayres and Joe Bankman have also recommended limiting the deduction to a
new kind of qualifying mortgage. Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, Stop Subsidizing Risky Mortgages (2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
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(b) 30% DTI Condition: the mortgage must have no potential periodic
payment that would exceed a debt-to-income (DTI) ratio of
30%;121 and

(c) 30-year Repayment Condition: the mortgage schedule of payments
must repay the principal and accrued interest within 30 years or
before the borrower reaches 65, whichever is sooner.
The first condition's requirement of minimal equity would be troubling if
it were imposed by itself. Establishing a floor of 5% might perversely induce
more clustering than would occur in a world without a legal minimum. Housing
and mortgage markets may be exposed to more risk of simultaneous defaults if
homeowners concentrate at 5% equity than if some put 1% down, others put
5% down, and still others put 9% down. But the combination of the three
conditions is minimally sufficient to start borrowers on an amortization path of
increasing equity. As in the amortization era, the diachronic borrowing of
successive cohorts of homeowners will be sufficient to induce beneficial
diversity in home equity, as less recent borrowers will be more likely to have
paid back part of their outstanding balance. These temporally staggered
repayment schedules help mitigate the concern that equity requirements will
induce clustering at the minimum.
The second DTI condition would exclude wildly uneven gyrations in
payments that would threaten to outstrip the borrower's ability to pay. Under
this second condition, the maximum of any prospective required periodic
payment under the mortgage terms could not be more than 30% of the
borrower's periodic income at the time of the loan origination. This "life-of-the
loan" DTI condition would effectively prohibit balloon mortgages, because the
required balloon at the end of the mortgage would be more than 30% of what
the borrower's monthly income was at the time of origination. The DTI
condition would also disqualify mortgages with initial teaser rates that
ultimately reset to higher rates with associated payments that violated the 30%
DTI cap. The DTI condition would not disqualify all adjustable-rate mortgages,
but to qualify, the adjustable-rate mortgages would need to include interest rate
caps that assured that the monthly mortgage payments would not exceed 30%
of what the borrower's monthly income was at the time of origination.
The DTI condition does not guarantee that mortgagors will be able to
make their monthly payments. There is, for example, still the risk that
borrowers will be laid off in an economic downturn. But making sure that the
maximum required mortgage payments fall below 30% of the borrower's
income at time of origination helps assure that the borrower will not need to
refinance solely because the mortgage terms allow for an unsustainable rise in

121.
With regard to the Dodd-Frank QRM proposal, the mortgage must not have any
potential periodic payment that would exceed the 30% DTI cap based on the current schedule of
payments. See infra Section II.C.
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mortgage payments. Qualifying mortgages do not eliminate systemic risk, but
they help assure that risk is not exacerbated by artificially forcing borrowers to
refinance during times of economic turmoil.
More broadly, to satisfy both the DTI condition and the 30-year
repayment condition, mortgage repayment schedules will need to amortize
repayments on a fairly continuous basis. Traditional 30-year fixed mortgages
that satisfy the DTI condition with regard to the first monthly payment will a
fortiori satisfy the condition with regard to all subsequent fixed payments.
Loans would not, however, need to rigidly adhere to constant amortization. The
possibility of temporary negative amortization, for example, as contemplated
by once-a-year mortgage holiday provisions, would not be disqualifying so
long as the remaining payments adhered to the 30% DTI requirement.
The idea behind the age limit in the third condition is to be more
consistent with the life-of-the-loan DTI goal. A 60-year-old who borrows on a
30-year basis isn't likely to have the same income after reaching 70 or 80. For
couples, the rule might ask whether the DTI test is satisfied if we assume that
income goes to zero when the older spouse hits 65. Macroprudentially, there
might be higher risk with many 70-year-old borrowers with loans that they
can't repay (and can't refinance if we have another credit freeze-the beauty of
a life-of-the-loan DTI test is that borrower never needs to go back to the
refinancing market). The requirement that loans are paid off before retirement
also is consonant with thinking of the mortgage deduction as a retirement
account. And for those who wish to curtail the home mortgage interest tax
expenditure, it would also have the advantage of cutting off the deduction for
more elderly borrowers.
An important limitation of the three foregoing conditions, however, is that
they do not respond to the untoward effects of equity stripping that can occur
years after a mortgage has been issued. To respond to this problem, a fourth
prerequisite might be added for homeowners to qualify for the deduction:
(d) Taxpayers who claim a home mortgage interest deduction with
regard to a particular property must agree not to undertake any
subsequent cashing out of amortized principal unless they have
reached the age or established the kind of hardship that would
analogously allow them to withdraw without penalty from a
401(k) account.
This condition would subject any non-qualifying cashing out of accrued
equity to a 20% penalty. Borrowers would be able to cash out excessive down
payments (which exceeded the initial 5% requirement), and borrowers would
be able to cash out appreciation in the value of the underlying house, but
borrowers would be penalized for cashing out any amortized repayment of
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principal (unless the borrowers satisfied the age or hardship requirements for
401(k) distributions). 122 For example, imagine a home that was purchased for
$100,000 with the borrower placing $10,000 down and borrowing $90,000 with
a 30-year fixed interest loan. After a number of years, imagine that $20,000 of
the principal had been repaid (so that a $70,000 principal was outstanding), and
imagine that the house had increased in value to $130,000. Under the fourth
condition, the homeowner would be able to cash out without penalty $35,000
(the $30,000 of home appreciation plus the $5,000 of excessive initial down
payment). However, the homeowner would incur a 20% tax if she went further
and cashed out the $20,000 of amortized interest (unless the homeowner could
meet the statutory age or hardship requirements for 401(k) distributions). 123
This 20% cash out penalty is analogous to the 20% 401(k) early distribution
penalty. Psychologically, the goal is to have homeowners start thinking of their
home equity as a retirement asset. Under this modified tax rule, the condition of
the interest deduction is that taxpayers accept 401(k) limits on their equity
saving.
The central purpose of the fourth condition is not, however, to promote
retirement savings. It is instead to dampen the untoward macroeconomic
impact of equity stripping. Homeowners could still accomplish equity stripping
by selling their homes and cashing out their accumulated equity (and then
buying a subsequent house with a 95% loan-to-value ratio),124 but the many
homeowners who wish to stay put in their current houses would not be able to
cash out their accumulated repayments of principal until they reached the
required age (or unless they could establish legitimate hardship). The goal is to
dampen the prevalence of homeowners who cash out equity before retirement
to finance discretionary spending.125
This proposal for tax reform is not a command-and-control mandate.
Homeowners would not be required to borrow using qualified mortgages. They
simply would not be able to deduct interest if their mortgages were non-

122.
See generally 401(k) Resource Guide - Plan Participants- General Distribution
Rules, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/40
l(k)-Resource-Guide---Plan-Participants---General-Distribution-Rules (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
123.
To implement the regulation, subsequent lenders would be prohibited from taking
a security interest in the borrower's interest in the amortized principal. This would mean that subsequent
lenders' claims would be subordinated to an unchanging original principal amount of $90,000 even if
the original principal had in fact been paid down.
124.
It would be possible to go further and require that accrued equity ($20,000 in the
previous example) would need to be rolled into any subsequent house as an additional pre-requisite of
taking an interest deduction.
125.
While Ayres & Bankman, supra note 120, consider the fourth proposal, they
ultimately reject it because of the potential difficulty of implementation. The first three conditions can
be assessed at the moment of origination. The fourth needs to be evaluated at the moment of any nonacquisition secured lending that contemplates cash-out to a borrower who has previously been taking
deductions on the property. A more stringent condition would apply a 20% tax penalty to all cash-out
refinances that did not meet the age or hardship requirements-thus prohibiting mortgagors from
cashing out excessive down payments or capital appreciation.
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qualifying. Limiting the deduction to qualifying loans would help assure that
the government eliminates subsidies for the kinds of mortgage terms that
exacerbate systemic risk. Even without the tax subsidy, some homeowners
might deleteriously choose to cluster in low down payment, interest-only loans.
And notwithstanding the penalty, taxpayers who have taken an interest
deduction may deleteriously choose to engage in equity stripping. But the hope
is that these financial nudges may be sufficient to induce homeowners to make
borrowing decisions that in aggregate reduce systemic risk.
C. Reforming the Dodd-FrankRisk-Retention Proposal

Dodd-Frank's risk-retention mechanism can be seen as an attempt to
nudge the mortgage market away from low-equity clustering, but it does so by
giving lenders incentives to originate loans that in aggregate will produce less
systemic risk. Under 15 U.S.C. § 78o-1 1, the "federal banking agencies", 26 are
directed to issue regulations requiring the issuers of asset-backed securities to
retaih 5% of the credit risk of assets that are "transferred, sold, or conveyed
through the issuance of an asset-backed security by the securitizer."l 27 The
Senate Committee Report on the Dodd-Frank Act noted that the purpose of the
credit risk-retention requirements was to "align [securitizers'] economic
interests with those of investors in asset-backed securities."1 28 Indeed, credit
risk-retention requirements have the positive effect of giving securitizers "a
strong incentive to monitor the quality of the assets they purchase from
originators, package into securities, and sell."1 29
However, the statute expressly exempts "qualified residential mortgages"
("QRMs") from credit risk-retention requirements.1 30 Requiring originators to
retain merely 5% of their non-QRM originations does not at first blush seem
like a very strong incentive. But for originators who had been using the
securitization market to relend the same capital hundreds of times,' 31 the
inability to reuse 5% of non-QRM originations might pose a major constraint.
Under Dodd-Frank, there can only be $20 of non-QRM loans for every $1 of
originator capital.

126.
This term is defined as the "Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-l l(a)(1) (2012).
127. E.g., id. § 78o-1l(c)(1)(B)(i)(I). This phrase also appears in id. § 78oI l(c)(1)(B)(i)(II) and id. § 78o-1 l(c)(1)(B)(ii).
128.
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 129 (2010).
129. Id.
130. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-l l(c)(1)(B)(i)(I) (2012) ("The regulations prescribed under
subsection (b) shall . . . require a securitizer to retain not less than 5 percent of the credit risk for any
asset that is not a qualified residential mortgage that is transferred, sold, or conveyed through the
issuance of an asset-backed security by the securitizer . . . .").
See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
131.
Finance ofPredatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2039, 2044 (2007).
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The statute does not define a QRM but directs regulators to define the
term while taking into account:
[U]nderwriting and product features that historical loan performance data
indicate result in a lower risk of default, such as . . . standards with respect to the

residual income of the mortgagor after all monthly obligations; the ratio of the
housing payments of the mortgagor to the monthly income of the mortgagor; the
ratio of total monthi installment payments of the mortgagor to the income of
the mortgagor ... .
On April 11, 2011, six financial regulators authorized by Dodd-Frank
proposed a rule containing a multi-factored QRM definition that restricts both
loan terms and borrower credit history characteristics. 133 To qualify under the
proposed rule, the terms of a residential mortgage must:
(a) Be a first lien loan with scheduled repayment of principal and
interest within 30 years;
(b) Not have less than 20% down payment;
(c) Not allow negative amortization or deferred payment of interest or
principal;
(d) Not allow a scheduled payment that is more than twice as large as
any earlier payment;
(e) Not allow an increase in interest of more than 2% in any year and
more than 6% over the life of the loan;
(f) Not allow points and fees of more than 3% of the total loan
amount; and
(g) For the first five years, not allow a debt-to-income ratio of more
than 28% and a total debt-to-income ratio of more than 36%.134
These multi-factored tests are an admirable attempt to make progress on
the twin problems of consumer and financial stability protection. This riskretention nudge indirectly incentivizes lenders to require larger down payments

132.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-l l(e)(4)(B) (2012).
133.
See Credit Risk Retention Proposed Rules, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,121 (Apr. 29,
2011) (proposed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve Board, FDIC, SEC,
FHFA, and HUD). The proposed rules define a series of "derogatory factors" that would disqualify a
borrower from obtaining a qualified residential mortgage, including: (a) not currently thirty or more
days past due on any obligation; (b) never sixty or more days past due on any prior obligation within the
past 24 months; and (c) not have "been a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding, had property repossessed or
foreclosed upon, engaged in a short sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, or been subject to a Federal or
State judgment for collection of any unpaid debt" within the past thirty-six months. Id. For a detailed
analysis of the proposed rules governing the new credit risk retention requirements under the DoddFrank Act, see SecuritizationAfter Dodd-Frank: A Look at the ProposedRisk Retention Rules, SIMPSON
THACHER (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.stblaw.com/content/Publications/publ 185.pdf.
134.
Credit Risk Retention Proposed Rules, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,121 (Apr. 29,
2011).
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and more consistent amortization. The "twice as large" limitation effectively
disqualifies all balloon loans and the interest adjustment caps limit the impact
of teaser rates to artificially induce refinancing at the loan reset time. Still, we
find that the proposed rule is needlessly harsh on some of its requirementsespecially the 20% down payment requirement-while perversely lax with
regard to other requirements-especially the 5-year DTI limitation. This
Section will suggest ways to modify the proposed rule to correct for these
errors.
We begin by looking more closely at the down payment mandate. Even
though down payment prerequisites were not mentioned in the statute, the
proposed rule requires a minimum down payment of 20% of the market value
or purchase price of the property, whichever is lower. 135 The proposed qualified
residential mortgage exemption responds to the problem of low-equity
clustering discussed above.136 A 20% minimum might cause a clustering at
20%, but that level of initial equity is sufficiently high that the concern that
normal fluctuations in housing prices would cause a synchronized waive of
defaults is remote. The 20% buy-in requirement is akin to a 99-year flood levy,
which will only rarely fail.
The problem, however, is that like an overly protective flood levy, such a
large down payment requirement can impose a substantial burden on borrowers
who are creditworthy but unable to accumulate sufficient funds. Indeed, the
proposed rules prompted an outcry among consumer advocates and trade
associations, who emphasized the immense harm that such a high standard
would cause to creditworthy borrowers who have historically benefited from
lower down-payment requirements. For example, the National Association of
Realtors presented a study showing that "it would take more than a decade for
the median American family to save enough for a 20% down payment on even
a modest home."l37 Moreover, an analysis by the Coalition for Sensible
Housing Policy found that imposing a fixed minimum down payment
requirement of 20% would "knock[] 15 to 20 percent of borrowers out of QRM

135.
See id. The regulators also expressly rejected financing closing costs to circumvent
these down payment requirements, citing Austin Kelly, Skin in the Game: Zero Down Payment
Mortgage Default, 17 J. OF HOUSING RES. 75 (2008) (linking increased default to low equity levels).
136.
Interestingly, FHA-insured and other government-insured mortgages are excluded
from the credit risk retention requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(3)(B) (2012). In light of the low
down payment requirements for the loans, it appears that the rules are actually creating an incentive to
shift the credit risk for low down payment mortgages onto the government's balance sheet rather than
the private sector's. This has its own potentially negative implications, for it is far from clear that the
government is better at managing low-equity credit risk than private lenders. Cf Timiraos, supra note
117 (describing serious concerns over the solvency of the FHA). The licensing regime proposed infra
Section IV.A would permit licenses to be traded, thus facilitating ownership of low-equity loans by the
party best able to manage this credit risk.
137.
Proposed Qualified Residential Mortgage Definition Harms Creditworthy
Borrowers While Frustrating Housing Recovery, COAL. FOR SENSIBLE Hous. POL'Y 12 (2011),
http://www.realtor.org/wps/wcm/connect/b4ff208047dl0e558blacb93a9fDl Ida/CoalitionForSHPW
hite Paper August-1-201 1.pdf (presenting study by the National Association of Realtors).
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eligibility, with only small improvement in default performance of about eighttenths of one percent on average."l 38 While there might be a greater benefit to
higher equity levels than the Coalition is willing to concede, there is little
reason to doubt its contention that a high fixed down payment
requirement would impose a very real cost.
These conclusions are supported by academic studies as well, which have
found that higher LTV requirements decrease homeownership rates.139 Indeed,
a recent study under the auspices of the University of North Carolina Center for
Responsible Lending and the nonprofit Center for Responsible Lending
concluded that the harm caused by such a high fixed down payment
requirement far outweighs its benefits.'4 Interestingly, the study found that the
burden imposed by the qualified residential mortgage rule would fall
disproportionately on minority and low-income borrowers.14 1 Utilizing loanlevel data from two proprietary databases, these researchers concluded that at
the proposed fixed down payment level of 20%, "the vast majority of
borrowers-approximately 85 percent-would not have qualified for a QRM
mortgage, with the impacts greatest for African Americans (93 percent) and
Latinos (91 percent)."1 42 Indeed, research has shown that these traditionally
disadvantaged groups have already suffered disproportionately from the
financial crisis.143 Denying creditworthy minorities and low-income borrowers
the opportunity to own a home would increase inequality'" and deprive society

138.
Id. at 6.
139.
See, e.g., Peter Linneman et al., Do Borrowing Constraints Change U.S.
Homeownership Rates?, 6 J. HOUSING ECON. 318, 330 (1997) (describing the effect of increasing LTV
ratios on changes in homeownership rates).
140.
Roberto G. Quercia et al., BalancingRisk and Access: UnderwritingStandardsfor
QualifiedResidentialMortgages, CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL (2012), http://ccc.sites.unc.edulfiles/2013/0
2/QRM Underwriting.pdf.
141.
Id. at 33-34.
142.
Id. at 34.
143.
E.g., Katrin B. Anacker & James H. Carr, Analysing Determinants ofForeclosure
Among High-Income African American and Hispanic Borrowers in the Washington, DC Metropolitan
Area, 11 INT'L J. HoUSING POL'Y 195 (2011) (showing that "high-income African-American borrowers
are 36 per cent and Hispanic borrowers 79 per cent more likely to go into foreclosure"); Debbie
Gruenstein Bocian et al., Foreclosuresby Race and Ethnicity: The Demographicsof a Crisis, CTR. FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING (2010), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis
/foreclosures-by-race-and-ethnicity.pdf (arguing that African-American and Latino borrowers
disproportionately suffered from foreclosure from 2007 through 2009); Debbie Gruenstein Bocian et al.,
Lost Ground, 2011: Disparities in Mortgage Lending and Foreclosures, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING (2011), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/Lost-Ground
-2011 .pdf (examining 27 million mortgages and finding that "borrowers of color are more than twice as
likely to lose their home as white households").
144.
The gap between whites and persons of color has grown substantially since the
onset of the financial crisis. See, e.g., Paul Taylor et al., Twenty-to-One: Wealth Gaps Rise to Record
CTR.
(2011),
and Hispanics, PEw
RESEARCH
Highs Between
Whites,
Blacks
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-Wealth-Report_7-26-1 IFINAL.pdf. While home
prices have fallen since the onset of the crisis, homeownership has historically led to greater wealth
among low-income households compared to renting over the long-term. See, e.g., Michael A. Stegman
et al., The Wealth-Creating Potential of Homeownership: A Preliminary Assessment of Price
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of the positive externalities resulting from increased homeownership.145
Moreover, the reduced demand resulting from such a rule might well depress
housing prices even further, destroying wealth for millions of white
homeowners (and possibly causing additional defaults) as well.
While we view the 20% down payment requirement to be too severe, it at
least furthers the regulatory project of reducing systemic risk. More bizarre to
us is the regulation's 5-year limitation on its DTI requirement. Like our
proposed modification to the home mortgage interest deduction, the DoddFrank risk-retention proposal disqualifies any mortgage where the maximum
payment pursuant to the mortgage provisions exceeds 28% of the borrower's
income at the time of the loan origination. As discussed earlier, a DTI
requirement (combined with the 30-year repayment requirement) goes a
remarkably long way in inducing fairly continuous amortization of the
outstanding principal-and eliminates balloon and interest resets that create
payment obligations beyond borrowers' means. But without explanation, the
proposed regulations limit the DTI requirement to only the first five years of
mortgage payments. Under the proposed regulation, there is nothing to stop a
mortgage from having a 5-year reset that doubles the payment to an
unsustainable DTI of 56%.146 Thus, the proposed QRM definition allows the
very kind of payment resets that can force borrowers to refinance. Recent
experience teaches that when a substantial number of borrowers have to
simultaneously refinance because of these resets, housing and mortgage
markets can be exposed to increased volatility.
The center of our proposal is to suggest that the DTI requirements be
applied to all of the loan payments. The proposal is straightforward to
implement and indeed can be accomplished by merely deleting eighteen words
from the proposed regulation.147 Unlike the down payment requirement,

Appreciation Among Low-Income Homebuyers, in CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP (William M. Rohe & Harry L. Watson eds., 2007).

145.
There is a vast body of scholarship examining the social benefits of
homeownership. A seminal study on the topic is Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives
and Social Capital:Are Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECON. 354 (1999), which found that
homeownership leads to higher levels of citizenship and social capital as a result of decreased mobility
compared to renting. However, there are potential endogeneity problems with this approach, and a
recent study of low-income homeowners utilizing a field experiment called into question some of these
conclusions. Gary V. Engelhardt et al., What are the Social Benefits of Homeownership? Experimental
Evidence for Low-Income Households, 67 J. URB. ECON. 249 (2010). Nonetheless, this study arrived at
no conclusive findings regarding most of the benefits of homeownership. See id. at 255 ("Our clearest
set of results is for the impact of homeownership on political involvement . . . . For most of the other
outcomes, the results are not conclusive."). It was also limited in duration to four years, leading its
authors to emphasize that "the results provide estimates of the short-term effects of homeownership on
social capital and local amenities, but not long-term effects." Id. at 256.
146.
The "twice as large" requirement operates independent of the DTI requirement and
is not limited to the first five years of payments.
147.
Specifically by eliminating "during the first five years after the date on which the
first regular periodic payment will be due" from Credit Risk Retention Proposed Rules, 76 Fed. Reg.
24,090, 24,126 (Apr. 29, 2011).
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applying the DTI requirement to all scheduled payments would not preclude
credit-worthy borrowers from obtaining financing. As with our home-mortgage
interest deduction proposal, it would only move borrowers toward mortgages
that capped the maximum interest rate at an amount that was within the
borrowers' means.148
A second modification that mirrors our home-mortgage interest deduction
would be to disqualify cash-out refinancing transactions. The current QRM
excludes second-lien mortgages and thus already impedes one loan type that
has been used to facilitate equity stripping. But the current QRM does not
disqualify non-acquisition transactions in which a borrower replaces initial
acquisition loans with a higher-balance first lien loan and in so doing cashes
out the difference in principle. As discussed above, equity stripping by large
segments of mortgagors almost certainly exacerbated the housing crisis.
Adding a no-cash-out requirement to the QRM definition will not have the
exclusionary effect on home acquisition of the 20% down payment
requirement, but will help reduce systemic risk by increasing the likelihood that
different cohorts of mortgagors will have different amounts of accrued equity.
If the 5-year limitation to the DTI requirement is removed and a no-cashout requirement is added, it should be possible to lower the down payment
requirement to a less exclusionary 5 or 10% level. Indeed, a thoroughgoing DTI
requirement (combined with the 30-year repayment requirement) would
substantially simplify the QRM definition. For example, the "no negative
amortization" requirement is not necessary in a world where the DTI
requirement is applied to all potentially required payments. From the standpoint
of systemic volatility, we need not prohibit temporary negative amortizationso long as it is not sufficient to drive the DTI beyond the point of sustainability.
Similarly, the requirement that no scheduled payment be more than twice as
large as any earlier payment is not necessary in the shadow of an enhanced DTI
requirement. Initial teaser rates less than half of the long-term rate are not a
problem from the standpoint of systemic risk as long as the long-term rate is
within the borrower's ability to pay.149 Overall, a modified version of the QRM
definition with reduced down payments, a DTI requirement that applied for the
life of the loan, and a prohibition of cash-out transactions would have a much
smaller exclusionary impact on low-income borrowers, but still provide strong
lender incentives to put borrowers on a path toward amortizing equity.150
Alternatively, the DTI requirement might only be suspended after the latter of five
148.
years or when the borrower has acquired at least 20% of the equity in the house. If the down payment
requirement is reduced to 10%, a borrower with a 30-year fixed mortgage with 7% APR would only
reach 20% equity after 8.33 years (and at a 10% APR, a borrower would only achieve a 20% equity
position after 11.33 years).
Some of the QRM requirements-such as the 3% cap on points and fees-might
149.
be retained, however, to paternalistically protect borrowers from being taken advantage of by loan
originators.
At the time of writing, the federal agencies released a new QRM proposed rule,
150.
which incorporates some of the reforms we suggest in this Section. Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg.
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IV. Direct Macroprudential Regulation of the Distribution of Equity
This Part takes up a third, more direct approach: regulating the
distribution of home equity at the macroprudential level. We delineate two
proposals: (1) a system of tradable leverage licenses that would apply to
mortgage origination nationwide; and (2) a new definition of "conforming
mortgage" utilized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The former is a thought
experiment that would directly shape the distribution of equity but requires
substantial legislative action. The latter is a more implementable solution that
does not require extensive statutory reform and operates by affecting the
economic incentives of private mortgage lenders.
A. A System of TradableLeverage Licenses

To demonstrate how substantial legislative reform could permit direct
regulation of the distribution of home equity, in this Section we propose a
system of tradable leverage licenses. In contrast to the foregoing borrower and
lender incentives, a system of tradable leverage licenses would cap the number
of high leverage loans at quantities pre-specified by regulators. By requiring
that lenders obtain a license to originate mortgage loans, regulators can directly
influence the distribution of equity at both the national level and in specific
jurisdictions. Under our proposal, licenses would be contingent on three
variables: year, place and leverage. As a precondition to originating a highleverage mortgage, a lender would need to obtain licenses (from the
government or the tradable secondary market) for the jurisdiction, years, and
minimum levels of equity contemplated by the loan repayment schedule. For
concreteness, imagine a system that required licenses for four equity ranges:

57,928 (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-09-20/pdfl2013-21677.pdf. Most
significantly, they define QRM as identical to the CFPB's qualified mortgage (QM) standard, which has
the effect of removing the minimum 20% down payment requirement. However, QM (and thus QRM)
retains the five-year period for calculating DTI and does not prohibit cash-out refinances. See Ability-toRepay and Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(1)(i)
(2013). While we welcome the elimination of the overly broad 20% minimum down payment threshold,
as we explain in this Section both the five-year DTI calculation and the ability to engage in cash-out
refinancing contribute to equity stripping and thus facilitate low-equity clustering. Moreover, there is no
need to limit the regulatory response to one of two extremes of either a heavy-handed 20% minimum
(prior QRM proposal) or no down payment requirement (new QRM proposal). By not regulating equity
levels at all, the new QRM rule fails to address the substantial threat to systemic stability posed by lowequity clustering. As we suggest in Section IV.A, a system of leverage licensing allows some limited
quantity of low-down payment mortgages while preventing excessive clustering of low-equity loans.
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Table 10: Example Distribution of Leverage Licenses
Quantity of Licenses*
Equity Range
1%
Less than 5%
5%
Less than 10%
20%
Less than 20%
30%
Less than 30%
*Quantity expressed as a percentage of residential homes in jurisdiction.
A lender who wanted to originate a zero down payment, thirty-year fixed
8% rate mortgage would need to obtain jurisdiction-specific licenses at the time
of origination for the future years in which the mortgage would fall into
specified equity ranges. In this specific example, the lender would need to
obtain "Less than 5%" licenses for the first five years, "Less than 10%"
licenses for years six through nine, "Less than 20%" licenses for years ten
through fourteen, and "Less than 30%" licenses for years fifteen through
eighteen. 151
By requiring the lender to obtain a series of year-specific and jurisdictionspecific licenses, regulators could help assure that at any moment in time, there
were no more than a certain percentage of high-leverage loans in a particular
housing market. Year-specific licenses also allow market participants more
flexibility in offering different repayment schedules. Mortgages with larger
down payments or shorter amortization periods would require licenses for
fewer years. On the other hand, interest-only mortgages or adjustable-rate
mortgages with the possibility of large increases in mortgage payments would
tend to require more licenses as the loan potentially lingered at higher levels of
equity for more years.152 In a world with a limited quantity of year-specific
leverage licenses, regulators need not prohibit zero percent down payment
interest-only loans in order to manage systemic risk. They only need limit the
number of such high default risk loans to an amount that the specific housing
market can be expected to absorb.
Our licensing proposal only regulates the expected level of leverage that
would obtain if the underlying home value remains level after origination.
Negative shocks to housing prices can produce increased leverage
notwithstanding lender compliance with ex ante licensing. For example, a
mortgage that originated with a 5% down payment would not need "Less than
5%" licenses for any repayment year. But after the mortgage issued, a decrease
in housing prices could cause the homeowner to in fact have less than 5%
equity in her house. Like our earlier proposed regulations of DTI (which

151.
In contrast, if the borrower made a 10% down payment and borrowed the
remainder with a thirty-year fixed 8%mortgage, the lender would need to obtain no "Less than 5%" or
"Less than 10%" licenses, and instead would need to obtain "Less than 20%" licenses for years one
through ten, and "Less than 30%" licenses for years eleven through fifteen.
152.
For example, a thirty-year adjustable rate mortgage that allowed the interest to
increase to a 12% APR would require "Less than 5%" licenses for the first nine years of the loan.
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assumed constant debtor income), the leverage licenses regulations would
assume constant home values. Our licensing proposal accordingly does not
eliminate systemic risk in the housing market, but it does ensure that
homeowners have a more resilient distribution of equity going into a housing
price downturn.
Going beyond the nudges of the last two Sections and directly regulating
the maximum number of high leverage loans allows regulators to streamline
other aspects of the regulation. Our previous buyer and lender incentive
proposals regulated aspects of the transactions that might force borrowers to
return to the lending market to refinance their mortgages because of a balloon
or possibility of payments being reset to unsustainable DTIs. As argued above,
clusters of mortgages with these balloons and reset provisions exacerbated the
impact of normal fluctuations in housing prices, because lenders were unlikely
to refinance loans that had home values less than the outstanding principal. We
limited our qualifying mortgage definitions in both our tax-deduction and riskretention proposals to eliminate this underwater-refinancing risk. But this
refinancing risk is less of a concern in a world of leverage licensing because
there would be a limited number of underwater mortgages. To take an extreme
example, imagine that 100% of homes have a substantial balloon payment that
is due December 31, 2020, and that homeowners are maximally leveraged
going into 2019, taking full advantage of allowable licenses.15 3 Imagine further
that during the course of 2019, housing prices fall by 8%. When the balloon
payments become due, the lending market will be unlikely to lend to borrowers
who have less than 8%equity at the beginning of 2019-but there will only be
6% of homeowners who will fall into this category. Instead of eliminating
terms that might require refinancing, the leverage licensing works by limiting
the number of underwater refinancers. 154 The underwater mortgagors who
could not refinance would (as in the recent crisis) be forced to default on their
original loans. But the scope of defaults by design would be limited to a
number that could more likely be absorbed by the market without inducing a
further deterioration in housing prices.
As these licenses are tradable, a secondary market would permit their
acquisition by the bidders who value them most. Because licenses would be
separately obtained by lenders, the licensing requirement would not complicate
borrowers' decision making. Regulators would monitor the distribution of
153.
Thus, 1% of homeowners would have no equity in their homes, 5% of
homeowners would have 5% equity in their homes, 20% of homeowners would have 10% equity in their
homes, and 30% would have 20% equity in their homes.
154.
Even homeowners with positive equity may-after an 8% drop in housing
prices-have to refinance with more leverage, which would require more additional licenses. In the
foregoing example, 20% of homeowners might have had 10% equity before the 8% drop in housing
prices, implying that they would need to refinance with just 2% down. The percentage of high-leverage
refinancers might outstrip the number of available licenses. This example suggests circumstances where
regulators in the midst of a downturn would need to expand the number of licenses available (or create
refinance licensing exceptions) to allow such refinancing to occur.
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home equity through a reporting system and could issue additional licenses or
buy back licenses in the open market to provide needed liquidity or to prevent
low-equity clustering. Licenses could also further social policy goals, such as
directing low-equity loans to minorities or needy communities. Finally, limited
exemptions from the licensing requirement should be considered, along with
methods of enforcement and ways of transitioning existing mortgages into the
new regime.
1. Why Licensing? The Advantages of Tradable Permits
The starting point for this analysis is the recognition that from an
economic perspective, low-equity clustering constitutes a negative externality
because its social costs are not borne solely by the parties who take out or issue
low-equity loans.155 Lenders who originate loans at low down payment levels
enjoy the benefits of increased output but do not bear the consequences of the
systemic instability imposed on society as a whole. While no literature has
directly addressed the social cost of low-equity clustering from an economic
policy perspective,
much has been written on a highly analogous problem:
regulating carbon emissions and other environmental hazards. There are many
similarities between the two fields, but the essential commonality is that both
activities serve a valuable social purpose in certain limited quantities.157 Indeed,
as discussed above, systemic stability in the housing market would be improved
by maintaining certain proportions of loans at differing levels of low equity
while preserving sufficient "circuit breakers" to prevent a domino effect of
cascading falling prices.158 Similarly, emissions are essential to industrial
production and thus socially valuable in limited quantities. The regulatory
challenge posed by both emissions and low-equity lending is to ensure that the
market produces a reasonable quantity of output, not to ban the activity
entirely. One hundred thousand zero-equity mortgages scattered throughout the
United States would not substantially exacerbate systemic risk. The key

155. For a seminal discussion of externalities in the law and economics literature, see
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
156.
Some literature has addressed the danger of systemic risk posed by having so
many borrowers with underwater mortgages by calling for principal modification programs. E.g.,
Gregory Scott Crespi, The Trillion Dollar Problem of UnderwaterHomeowners: Avoiding a New Surge
ofForeclosures by EncouragingPrincipal-ReducingLoan Modifications, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 153
(2011); Eric A. Posner & Luigi Zingales, A Loan Modification Approach to the Housing Crisis, 11 AM.
L. & ECON. REv. 575 (2009); Manuel S. Santos, How Home Loan Modification Through the 60/40 Plan
Can Save the Housing Sector, 94 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis REV. 103 (2012).
157.
Prohibiting low-equity loans below a certain fixed down payment level would
have devastating social consequences. See discussion supra Section III.C (criticizing the Dodd-Frank
qualified residential mortgage standard for attempting to encourage fixed 20% down payment mortgage
loans).
158.
See discussionsupra Section I.B.
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problem of the last crisis was that millions of these loans were concentrated in a
few geographical markets.159
There have been several regulatory approaches to controlling
environmentally harmful pollutants and emissions over the past century, which
can shed light on the best method to regulate low-equity lending. The
traditional regulatory model, often termed "command-and-control," sought to
place the regulator in the role of directly instructing private actors as to
acceptable and unacceptable activity.' In the words of one advocate of this
model in the context of environmental pollution, command-and-control means
that "the government 'commands' pollution reductions (e.g., by setting
emissions standards) and 'controls' how these reductions are achieved (e.g.,
through the installation of specific pollution-control technologies).""' In the
context of low-equity clustering, a command-and-control approach might
involve setting lender-specific permissible equity levels and attempting to
ensure that lenders comply with these standards, perhaps by requiring approval
before individual loans are made or mandating reports of loan and equity levels
on a per-lender basis. As discussed above,162 some mandates might exacerbate
the clustering problem by inducing a substantial segment of borrowers to pool
at a minimum required down payment percentage. There are numerous
problems with a command-and-control approach, and it came under withering
criticism throughout the second half of the twentieth century.' 63
In response to the inefficiency of the command-and-control model,
economists advocated the adoption of so-called "market" systems, which
achieved environmental regulatory goals by instituting economic incentives for
private actors. 1 Today, these approaches are widely accepted by economists
as superior to the command-and-control model because these private incentives
ensure that goods flow to their highest-valued use. For example, in the context
of low-equity lending, a market-based system would permit lenders to pay a
price to lend at certain equity levels, thus permitting those lenders who are

See supraSection H.A.
159.
For a defense of command-and-control systems as worth considering in
160.
environmental regulation despite their unpopularity, see Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is
Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of
Alternative Regulatory Regimesfor EnvironmentalProtection, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 887.
161.
Id. at 887 n.1.
162.
See discussion supra Section III.B.
163.
See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1334 (1985); Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental
Regulation:A FailingParadigm,15 J. L. & COM. 585, 587-95 (1995).
164.
Volumes have been written on the economic approach to environmental
regulation. An influential survey of the initial empirical literature is found in T.H. Titenberg, Economic
Instrumentsfor Environmental Regulation, 6 OXFORD REv. ECON. POL'Y 17, 17 (1990) ("By changing
the incentives an individual agent faces, the best private choice can be made to coincide with the best
social choice. Rather than relying on the regulatory authority to identify the best course of action, the
individual agent can use his or her typically superior information to select the best means of meeting an
assigned emission reduction responsibility.").
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particularly well-positioned to provide low equity mortgages to serve
customers at the lowest cost and most efficient output.
Nonetheless, there has been considerable debate over which of the two
primary forms of market-based regulation of negative externalities is desirable:
Pigouvian taxes or tradable permits.165 A Pigouvian tax is a tax imposed on the
production of a good responsible for a negative social externality so as to
induce the producer to reduce output to the socially optimal quantity.166 A
tradable permit, on the other hand, directly regulates the overall industry-wide
output of the good, but allows producers to allocate the desired quantity levels
among themselves by trading on a secondary market. In a highly influential
article, Marty Weitzman famously showed that there is no inherent advantage
to either price or quantity controls because "in principle exactly the same
information is needed to correctly specify either."168 However, he emphasized
that there might be practical limitations that make tradable permits better than
taxes in a given context: "[I]f . .. it is difficult or expensive to monitor output
on a continuous scale but relatively cheap to perform a pass-fail litmus type test
attained or not, the price mode may be
on whether a given output level has been
69
greatly disadvantaged from the start."'
This is precisely the case with regulating low-equity lending. It is much
simpler to cap the quantity and let the market set the price for low-equity
clustering through tradable permits than to impose an optimal Pigouvian tax.
For example, if regulators set the Pigouvian price of borrowing with no equity

165.
For a brief overview of the leading views on this debate from an economic policy
perspective, see Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptionsfor Environmental Problems: How the
Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 95 (1989). Economic literature traditionally
favored Pigouvian taxes as the remedy of choice for negative externalities, particularly in the context of
environmental regulation. See, e.g., ARTHUR PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932); William J.
Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Use of Standards and Pricesfor Protection of the Environment, 73
SWEDISH J. ECON. 42 (1971). Later scholars, however, emphasized the possibility of employing tradable
permits, or quantity limitations that may be exchanged on a secondary market between producers. E.g.,
J. H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968) (suggesting the notion of tradable "pollution
rights"). A highly influential piece arguing in favor of the equality of tradable permits, if not their
outright superiority in certain circumstances, is Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV.
ECON. STUD. 477 (1974). See also Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523
(1984) (discussing the economic conception of law as a "set of official prices"). But see Robert N.
Stavins, Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits, 29 J. ENvTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 133 (1995) (arguing
that the potential transaction costs of a tradable permit system are non-trivial and that it is essential to
take these into consideration when comparing tradable permit models to more conventional approaches).
166.
See generally PIGOU, supra note 165. Pigovian taxes are named after Pigou who
was the first to suggest these taxes as a means to reduce output to the desired level.
167.
See generally DALES, supra note 165.
168.
Weitzman, supra note 165, at 478. But see Cooter, supra note 165, at 1531
(arguing that "behavior is more elastic with respect to prices than sanctions").
169.
Weitzman, supra note 165, at 479 n.3. But see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2002)
(arguing that well-designed tax schemes are superior to tradable permits). Kaplow and Shavell, however,
emphasize that nonlinear corrective taxes are particularly suited for "the case of externalities generated
by a single firm." Id. at 14. Yet mortgage lending is conducted by numerous loan originators, suggesting
that Kaplow and Shavell's argument is less convincing in this context.
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at, say, $2000, it might be too low-millions of borrowers might pay this price,
and the economy would again be exposed to the needless systemic risk caused
by low-equity bunching. 170
While a licensing regime does impose the administrative cost of
monitoring the distribution of home equity and adjusting the issuance of new
licenses to achieve desired system-wide equity goals, a tax-based system would
require this entire apparatus in addition to a sophisticated calculation of the
proper taxation amount that would bring about the desired quantity level. Even
if such a tax could be computed accurately, a licensing approach is much more
direct and saves considerable expense. Indeed, tradable permits have been
proposed in a variety of similar contexts. 71 Licenses are the best mechanism to
regulate the distribution of home equity and combat low-equity clustering.
Under our "cap and trade" regime, regulators would cap the maximum
amount and distribution of leverage in the system and then trade in the license
market would determine the price of purchasing leverage. An advantage of the
marketized system is not only that the low-equity loans flow to the highestvalue borrowers, but also that the cost of acquiring the licenses (which
ultimately will be borne by borrowers) gives borrowers better incentives to
borrow with repayment terms that promote systemic stability. Leverage
licensing gives borrowers better micro-contracting incentives because
borrowing with larger down payments or faster amortization would avoid the
need for the most quantity-constrained licenses.
2. Toward a New Regulatory Regime
The regulatory regime proposed in this Article begins with subjecting the
origination of residential mortgages,172 whether for an initial purchase or

170.
An intermediate form of regulation with attributes of both price and quantity
regulation would be to have Pigouvian taxes that increase with quantity. See generally Ian Ayres,
Narrow Tailoring,43 UCLA L. REV. 1781 (1996).
171.
E.g., Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 863 (2007); David Berry, The Market for Tradable Renewable Energy Credits, 42 ECOLOGICAL
ECON. 369 (2002); Kenneth M. Chomitz, TransferableDevelopment Rights and Forest Protection: An
Exploratory Analysis, 27 INT'L REG'L Sci. REV. 348 (2004); Douglas MacMillan, Tradeable Hunting
Obligations-A New Approach to Regulating Red Deer Numbers in the Scottish Highlands?, 71 J.
ENVTL. MGMT. 261 (2004); Alan Randall & Michael A. Taylor, Incentive-Based Solutions to
Agricultural Environmental Problems: Recent Developments in Theory and Practice, 32 J. AGRIC. &
APPLIED ECON. 221 (2000); Ricardo Bayon, A Bull Market in ... Woodpeckers?, MILKEN INST. REV. 30
(Mar. 2002) http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/review/2002 3/30 39.pdf.
172.
It is possible to apply the licensing regime to commercial loans as well. There is
nothing in this framework that uniquely applies to residential mortgages. However, commercial buyers
tend to be more sophisticated, and down payment requirements are usually much higher as a matter of
course. See, e.g., Sylvia Rosen, Commercial Mortgages Buyers' Guide, BUYERZONE,
http://www.buyerzone.com/finance/commercial-mortgages/bg-commercial-mortgage-borrowing-conside
rations (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) ("Commercial lenders generally require 20% to 30% down
payments."). Accordingly, it is less clear that the benefits from applying the licensing framework to
commercial loans would outweigh the costs.
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refinancing transaction, to a mandatory licensing requirement. As under
existing Truth-in-Lending disclosure laws,173 the licensing obligation would
apply to mortgage originators, i.e. the counterparties signing the loan
documents with the borrower. The legal mechanism for instituting the licensing
requirement would be to enact a law mandating that for any mortgage or deed
of trust securing a loan agreement for residential use, a lender must obtain in
advance of origination leverage-specific and jurisdiction-specific licenses for
the years in which the scheduled minimum amortization would produce equity
percentages that fall within one of the four prescribed ranges: less than 5%; less
than 10% (and greater than or equal to 5%); less than 20% (and greater than or
equal to 10%); and less than 30% (and greater than or equal to 20%). Lenders'
ownership of licenses would be registered in a public database, and a nonpublic supplement would also indicate whether each license was in use by
identifying the address of the residence for which the license was used. 174
Ideally, the mortgage deed would also contain the reference number of the
requisite licenses in order to notify regulators and other third parties that the
loan agreement was authorized. This deed disclosure would be particularly
beneficial if contractual non-enforceability was utilized to ensure compliance
with the licensing regime 75 because third parties could rely on the absence of
an authenticated licensing number in a mortgage deed as evidence of its nonenforceability.176
We favor a national regulatory system enacted by Congress. The Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) may recommend the licensing scheme to
the existing banking and financial regulators under its power to "identify gaps
in regulation that could pose risks to the financial stability of the United
States,"1 77 but it lacks the power to directly impose a licensing requirement for
mortgage origination. Similarly, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
lacks authority to institute this system because 12 U.S.C. § 5511 specifically
enumerates its powers, which do not include imposing a licensing requirement
on mortgage lending. Accordingly, statutory reform is necessary to implement
the licensing regime.178
173.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012) (mandating certain disclosures for mortgage
loan transactions); 15 C.F.R. § 226 (2013) (implementing the disclosure requirements of the Truth in
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2012)).
174.
The identity of license holders and the number of licenses in use would be public,
but the identity of specific housing transactions using the license would be non-public to preserve
homeowner privacy about the specifics of their finances.
175.
See discussion infra notes 189-190 and accompanying text.
176.
Of course, this raises issues with the transition period. Third parties would
presumably be aware that the licensing requirement applies only to loans issued after a certain date, such
that the absence of a valid license number on a deed prior to that date would not have any legal
implications.
177.
12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2)(G) (2012).
178.
This raises a question of whether the licensing regime restraining the ability of
actors to engage in ordinary contracting oversteps the reach of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause. In many cases, no constitutional problem would arise with a federal approach
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The notion of requiring licenses at the point of mortgage origination could
lead to an objection that licensing would be more effective if imposed at the
point of securitization. Since securitization in the secondary market drives the
demand for mortgage origination, it might be possible to impose the licensing
requirement upon securitizers. Nonetheless, there are several practical problems
with imposing the licensing requirement at the securitization level. It is the
actual act of initiating-originating-the mortgage loan that shapes the
distribution of equity in a given region or nationwide. Imposing a requirement
that securitizers obtain a license before purchasing a loan from an originator
would simply raise the cost of securitization and thus merely encourage
originators to hold rather than securitize such loans. This would not
substantially affect systemic stability because non-securitized loans could still
be offered at any equity level. Moreover, it would be much more difficult for
regulators to evaluate whether a given loan was properly licensed because the
derivative securities created from one mortgage may be repackaged and widely
dispersed among investors. More generally, regulating the resale of a mortgage
is far more difficult than restricting the original transaction that initiated the
loan.
3. Setting the Size of the Caps and Defining the Jurisdictions
To implement a licensing system, it is necessary to tailor several
dimensions of the licenses. The foregoing example imagined specific leverage
ranges and arbitrarily set the number of licenses as a proportion of the number
of residential homes. However, there is nothing magical about either the
specific leverage ranges or the cap sizes laid out above in Table 10. Regulators
would ideally set the number of licenses for particular leverage ranges by
considering the risk of particular price downturns, the likelihood that a price
downturn would induce mortgage defaults, and the ability of the market to
absorb defaults if affected homes in a particular equity range were unleashed on
the market by foreclosure sales. In setting the number of licenses for different
levels of leverage, regulators should trade off the macroeconomic benefits of

because many loans are originated across state lines. Yet even for mortgages that originate entirely
within one state, the Commerce Clause, even after Lopez and its progeny, is unlikely to prevent a federal
licensing requirement. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Though the fundamental legal
instrument in question-secured liens-is a product of state law, even purely intrastate mortgage
transactions may affect the interstate housing market. Indeed, federal truth-in-lending law and HMDA
regulations have routinely been upheld as appropriate uses of federal power, and the ongoing financial
crisis vividly demonstrates that housing instability in individual states can produce nationwide impacts.
Alternatively, compliance with the licensing regime might be implemented as a condition for receiving
federal benefits of some kind such as registration as a federal bank or even participation in an interstate
market. For example, Congress could mandate that mortgage securities may not be sold across state
lines unless the underlying mortgages are licensed as required by the licensing regime. If all else fails,
Congress might institute a penalty for holding a noncompliant mortgage, akin to the Affordable Care
Act's individual responsibility penalty recently upheld by the Court under the Taxing Power. See Nat'l
Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012).
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fewer licenses with the microeconomic costs on affected homeowners. The
foregoing caps imagined a monotonically increasing number of licenses for
higher levels of equity, but regulators might also consider a "circuit breaker"
approach that issued fewer licenses for intermediate levels of leverage.179
The number of outstanding licenses can also be updated by ongoing
regulatory interventions in the licensing market. Regulators could issue
additional licenses when they saw untoward shortages that unduly impeded
transactions that would not undermine market stability. Or regulators who
feared that the housing market was becoming overheated might limit highleverage speculation by buying back certain licenses in open market
transactions. Robert Shiller has analogously suggested increasing the leverage
requirements for buying stock on margin when P/E ratios suggest increased risk
of a stock bubble.1o Regulators who see the price/rental ratio increasing might
similarly intervene to reduce the number of leverage licenses.
The licensing framework should thus include an equity monitoring
component that would require mortgage servicers to report both the outstanding
principal balance remaining as well as the estimated current value of the
home-using Zillow-like automated appraisal technology based on comparable
sales. Once the technology was implemented, regulators could quickly obtain a
workable estimate about the distribution of homeowners' equity-based not
just on the outstanding licenses but on the amount of equity on the ground,
which can be impacted by prepayments and changes in pricing values.
Aggregate information on the distribution of equity can importantly inform
regulators' decisions on whether and how to intervene in the licensing market.
A license system would also need to define the geographic area over
which particular licenses could be used. An important goal would be to define
the areas with an eye toward the amounts of probable default that particular
markets could tolerate. Presumptively, tailoring the license coverage to broad
areas in which houses broadly compete on price and other factors would
capture the impact of foreclosure-induced selling on housing prices. Defining
the geographic market too broadly (say, at the national level) would allow a
cluster of highly leveraged homes in a particular local market that might
unnecessarily set up that market for economic dislocation. And the recent crisis
has shown that dislocation in specific states might result in untoward national
impacts. Accordingly, we think that licenses should at least be limited to

179.
For example, an equilibrium with relatively few mortgages with equity between,
say, 3% and 6% might provide a circuit breaker to impede a 5% downturn in pricing from inducing a
cascade of successive defaults and price downturns.
180.
Robert J. Shiller, Margin Calls: Should the Fed Step In?-Yes, It May Avert
Disaster,WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2000, http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/news/shiller/rjs 00-04-10 wsj margin
.htm.
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particular states and might even be limited to Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs)."'
Examining the distribution of equity at the local, state, or regional level
might enable regulators to better respond to cultural, demographic, and other
socioeconomic differences between borrowers in different regions. Some
regions, for example, might view negative equity-induced default as morally
wrong, suggesting that low-equity clustering might be less of a concern.
Ongoing adjustment of the license quantities would also allow regulators to
respond to mal-distributions of equity in particular areas. For example, in the
first quarter of 2011, the eleven states analyzed above exhibited the following
distribution of equity in their residential homesl82

181.
Metropolitan Statistical Areas are "geographic entities delineated by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for use by Federal statistical agencies in collecting, tabulating, and
publishing Federal statistics." Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas Main, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/metro (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
182.
The source of this data is described in our online appendix to this Article. Ian
Ayres & Joshua Mitts, Online Appendix to Three Proposalsfor Regulating the Distribution of Home
Equity (2013), http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres/onlineappendix.pdf.
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State
AZ
CA
FL
IL
MI
NJ
NV
NY
OH
PA
TX

Table 11: Distribution of Equity in 2011ql
<0% 0-3% 3-6% 6-9% 9-12% 12-15% 15-20% 20-50%
36%
0%
0%
0%
2%
0%
8%
25%
13%
3%
1% 2%
2%
3%
2%
20%
18%
1% 2%
2%
1%
4%
2%
24%
15%
4%
2%
4%
4%
1%
2%
25%
26%
3% 6%
5%
3%
5%
6%
14%
7%
1% 0%
0%
4%
4%
5%
16%
57%
0%
0%
0%
4%
0%
4%
7%
9%
0%
1% 3%
1%
0%
4%
24%
15%
2%
3%
5%
3%
0%
0%
28%
7%
0%
1%
1%
5%
2%
7%
35%
10%
5% 4%
6%
4%
4%
4%
28%

50-100%
29%
54%
45%
44%
31%
64%
29%
58%
44%
42%
35%

Note the wide disparities in the proportion of houses with negative equity.
More than half of Nevada homes (and more than a third of Arizona homes)
were financially underwater, whereas only 7% of New Jersey and Pennsylvania
homes were in this kind of distress. Regulators might respond by issuing fewer
leverage licenses in distressed areas (or possibly by allowing temporary
licensing exemptions for transactions that replaced negative equity mortgages
with modified mortgages that were less likely to default).
Moreover, the cascading effect of default and falling prices might be
much more pronounced at a neighborhood level, suggesting that regulating the
distribution of equity at even the sub-MSA level might be most effective in
combatting the potential consequences of low-equity clustering. More localized
licenses might also allow regulators to respond to the impact of licensing on
minorities and lower-income borrowers. Indeed, a key distinction between our
proposal and the QRM 20% minimum down payment is that under ours, lowerequity licenses could be issued selectively to benefit creditworthy borrowers
who lack sufficient capital to put more money down.
For example, regulators might create a still limited, but expanded, number
of licenses for houses located in the existing list of communities identified as in
need of assistance under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).' 83 The
primary purpose of the CRA is to ensure that depository institutions meet the
needs of their local communities, and criteria have been identified by the
federal agencies implementing the CRA to determine urban areas that are

183.
See generally 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2012); Community Reinvestment Act:
Background & Purpose, FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, http://www.ffiec.gov/cra/history.htn
(last visited Feb. 14, 2014) ("The Community Reinvestment Act is intended to encourage depository
institutions to help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they operate, including low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound banking operations.").
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considered underserved.184 For nonmetropolitan areas, the agencies may
analogously establish licenses for individual regions that are distressed or
underserved.' 85 For example, the category of distressed regions includes those
affected by poverty, unemployment, or substantial population loss.' The
category of underserved regions includes remote rural locations.' 87 The
agencies also track whether a region was designated as distressed or
underserved in the prior year. 88 These categories could serve as useful criteria
for establishing the number of area-specific licenses to balance the tension
between enhancing macroeconomic stability and making the dream of
homeownership available to creditworthy minorities and lower-income
borrowers who may lack the wealth to produce a large initial down payment.189
4. Transition and Enforcement
In steady state, one can easily imagine a system in which the license
regulator would periodically auction licenses for specific geographic areas,
specific equity percentages, and specific years. As a practical matter lenders
would not need licenses for more than thirty years in advance (and for
amortizing loans originators would not need to secure licenses for more than
fifteen years in advance). Any investor might purchase a license in
contemplation of reselling in the future to an originator at reasonable degrees of
amortization. But difficult questions arise about how to transition to this regime
in a world where a large stock of homeowners will exist at the time of adoption
who previously financed their homes without leverage licenses. One transition
approach would issue free-of-charge licenses for all existing mortgages for
current and future years according to the individual homeowner's current
amount of equity and scheduled repayments. An advantage of such a one-time

See, e.g., FFIEC Census Information Sheets, FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION
184.
COUNCIL, http://www.ffiec.gov/census/censusInfo.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) (describing the
census criteria employed by regulators when implementing depository institutions' obligations under the
CRA).
E.g., 2011 List of Middle-Income Nonmetropolitan Distressed or Underserved
185.
Geographies,FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL (2011), http://www.fliec.gov/cra/pdf/201 Idistress
edorunderservedtracts.pdf.
186.
For a detailed description of the methodology employed to calculate these
categories, see 2011 Distressed or UnderservedNonmetropolitan Middle-Income Geographies Source
Information and Methodology, FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL (2011), http://www.ffiec.gov/cra
/pdf/sourcelist201 I.pdf.
187.
See id.
188.
See FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 185.
That said, regulators should take care to ensure that a policy of directing low189.
equity licenses to underserved borrowers does not lead to geographic "pockets" of low-equity
mortgages. See, e.g., Meribah Knight & Bridget O'Shea, ForeclosuresLeave Pockets of Neglect and
Decay, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/us/foreclosures-lead-to-crime-a
nd-decay-in-abandoned-buildings.html. Of course, one does not necessarily follow from the other:
regulators can favor needy communities while still spreading out these low-equity licenses and ensuring
that geographic regions retain a sufficiently diverse distribution of equity.
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distribution is that it would give existing homeowners with high leverage an
economic incentive to reduce their leverage. This is because a homeowner with
a high-leverage mortgage could resell licenses granted for future years by
refinancing the loan on less leveraged terms. For states like Arizona where the
existing stock of negative equity mortgages radically exceeds the prudent level,
agency offers to buy back licenses that were distributed to existing
homeowners would provide an additional mechanism to incentivize
homeowners to modify and refinance their homes in ways that reduced
systemic market risk.
The question of how to enforce the licensing regime is particularly tricky.
The most traditional approach would simply impose penalties and sanctions for
noncompliance. Such a system might render the licensing system effective with
respect to large banks and institutional lenders who would likely comply, but
could have the unintended consequence of driving lending activity
"underground" and further out of regulatory oversight. This would require a
policing apparatus, which might be quite expensive because of the localized
nature of mortgage lending. Moreover, it is unclear who would be subject to
such top-down enforcement. As mortgage documents are typically presented to
consumers by mortgage brokers, brokers would be a natural target for
compliance with the licensing requirement. However, there are hundreds of
thousands of mortgage brokers, possibly making the cost of enforcement
prohibitively high. 190 Enforcing the licensing regime among loan originators
might be much cheaper, but could lead to customers signing unlicensed
mortgage documents and brokers merely relying on compliance at the point of
loan origination.
An alternative approach that might be more cost-effective is to utilize a
system of private enforcement by rendering the mortgage lien unenforceable
and the associated loan agreement voidable for unlicensed mortgages. This
would provide lenders with a strong incentive for compliance with the licensing
regime, and shift the burden of policing compliance to borrowers. However, the
prospect of unenforceability might lead to a dramatic increase in litigation as
borrowers facing foreclosure attempted to show that the mortgage was
unlicensed. These higher litigation costs would likely be passed on to
borrowers in the form of higher interest rates or reduced lending. Moreover,
enacting the unenforceability provisions at the state level might be extremely
difficult to accomplish as a practical matter. Any nonconforming states would
quickly become a haven for lenders seeking to escape the licensing burden,

See John Gittelsohn, U.S. Mortgage Brokers Get Criminal Check, Tests Under
190.
New Rules, BLOOMBERG (July 21, 2010, 9:40 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07(listing the total
21/mortgage-brokers-get-criminal-checks-with-new-u-s-rules-to-cut-loan-fraud.html
number of mortgage brokers nationwide as 246,900 as of May 2010).
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possibly rendering it impotent as a mechanism to regulate the market as a
whole. 191
B. Varying ConformingMortgagesfor FannieMae and FreddieMac

In this Section, we propose an alternative approach to regulating the
distribution of home equity that does not require the type of sweeping statutory
reform that would be necessary to implement the licensing scheme. The
"GSEs"-"Fannie Mae" and "Freddie Mac"-perform a central role in the U.S.
mortgage market. Instituting a new paradigm of variation into the definition of
"conforming mortgage" utilized by the GSEs would permit regulating the
distribution of home equity without directly restricting private contracting. This
proposal would give the GSEs an important role in preserving macroprudential
financial stability while only requiring minimal statutory reform.
1. The Role of the GSEs in the U.S. Mortgage Market
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fulfill an important role in the mortgage
market by purchasing and guaranteeing mortgages that are not insured or
guaranteed directly by the U.S. government. While government-insured loans
such as the FHA mortgages discussed in Subsection III.A.2 are attractive to
borrowers because their availability does not depend on macroeconomic credit
conditions, this explicit government guarantee comes at a price: the Department
of Housing and Urban Development imposes a surcharge on FHA loans in the
form of an up-front and annual mortgage insurance premium of 1.75% and
0.35-1.5% of the base loan amount, respectively.192 In the absence of
extraordinary market conditions, this surcharge renders government-backed
loans more expensive for borrowers than mortgages obtained in the private
market.
Even though private mortgages lack this surcharge for borrowers, private
lenders are likely to impose more stringent underwriting criteria or higher
interest rates than the FHA in the absence of any additional government support
because they lack an incentive to internalize the social benefit of widespread
homeownership. Accordingly, if the mortgage market consisted solely of
private lenders and government-insured loans, many creditworthy borrowers
who failed to qualify at reasonable rates under stringent self-interested private
lending criteria would be forced to obtain a mortgage through the governmentinsured programs with high fixed surcharges that were unnecessary in light of
these borrowers' relatively low credit risk. The GSEs step into this gap by
191.
On the other hand, a regional approach might still work within those states that are
willing to comply.
192.
Single Family Mortgage Insurance: Annual and Up-Front Mortgage Insurance
Premium-Changes, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URB. DEv. (Mar. 6, 2012), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal
/documents/huddoc?id=1204ml.pdf.

136

The Distribution of Home Equity
purchasing, guaranteeing, and repackaging private loans into mortgage-backed
securities that are resold on the secondary market to investors. This provides
crucial liquidity and effectively functions as a partial subsidy for originating
mortgages to the vast majority of borrowers whose credit profiles would justify
reasonable interest rates without the surcharge accompanying explicit
government-insured loans.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac offer to buy a variety of specific
"products"-i.e., mortgages with acceptable terms-that reflect market
conditions and borrower demand.193 But the GSEs are governed by a statutory
framework that permits only the acquisition of so-called "conforming
mortgages."1 94 The notion of a conforming mortgage is defined in each GSE's
enabling statute as a "conventional mortgage"-i.e., one not guaranteed by the
federal government-that meets a series of requirements, including maximum
principal limits and a prohibition on "the outstanding principal balance of the
mortgage at the time of purchase exceed[ing] 80 per centum of the value of the
property securing the mortgage." 195 However, the statute provides an exception
to the latter requirement: the GSEs may acquire loans with an excess of 80%
LTV if "that portion of the unpaid principal balance of the mortgage which is in
excess of such 80 per centum is guaranteed or insured by a qualified insurer as
determined by the [applicable GSE].' 96 The requirement to purchase private
mortgage insurance thus somewhat offsets the benefit of GSE involvement in
the mortgage markets for loans with an LTV greater than 80%.'19
The vast majority of mortgage lenders follow the GSE guidelines because
mortgage-backed securities packaged and resold by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac virtually dominate the secondary markets along with those from Ginnie
Mae, which resells government-insured loans.'9 This is likely a result of the

MAE,
FANNIE
Products,
Mortgage
Single-Family:
e.g.,
See,
193.
http://www.fanniemae.com/singlefamily/mortgage-products (last visited Feb. 14, 2014); Doing Business
With Freddie Mac, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/doingbusiness.html (last
visited Feb. 14, 2014).
194.
12 U.S.C. § 4502(26) (2012) (defining a "conforming mortgage" as "a
conventional mortgage having an original principal obligation that does not exceed the dollar amount
limitation in effect at the time of such origination and applicable to such mortgage" under the GSEs'
enabling statutes). The term "conforming mortgage" was added by the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008, and is not utilized in the GSE statutes, but simply reflects the substantive requirements for
GSE acquisition of loans as found in those statutes.
Id. § 1717(b)(2) (imposing this limitation on Fannie Mae); id. § 1454(a)(2)
195.
(imposing identical limitation on Freddie Mac).
Id. § 1717(b)(2).
196.
197.
Indeed, with high LTV ratios, private mortgage insurance may be so expensive
that an FHA loan is cheaper for borrowers.
DAILY,
NEWS
Dashboard, MORTGAGE
MBS
Live:
See
MBS
198.
http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/mbs (last visited Feb. 14, 2014); Mortgage-Backed Securities ETF
(VMBS): Portfolio,VANGUARD, http://institutional.vanguard.com/VGApp/iip/site/institutional/investme
nts/portfoliodetails?fundId=3148#state=90 (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) (mortgage-backed securities
exchange-traded fund consisting entirely of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed
securities).
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government guarantee that the GSEs enjoy after being subjected to FHFA
conservatorship in 2008,199 which renders private competition largely futile.
Accordingly, the statutory guidelines for lending limits and LTV ratios for the
GSEs largely determine the contours of the conventional mortgage market
similar to FHA's requirements for government-insured loans.
The key point in light of the analysis in this Article is that the regulatory
paradigm reflected in both the GSEs' and FHA's approach to minimum down
payments/LTV ratios consists of a binary, on/off approach to encouraging or
discouraging risky loans that does not consider the negative social externality
of an excessive concentration of mortgages at low levels of equity. As
discussed previously in Subsection III.A.2, the FHA's 3.5% minimum down
payment requirement directly facilitates low-equity clustering. But the GSE
guidelines, which determine the vast majority of the mortgage market, also fail
to take into account the systemic implications of a binary,
conforming/nonconforming approach to mortgage origination. The GSE statute
imposes increasing costs for lower down payments solely by requiring private
mortgage insurance. But private insurers do not necessarily internalize the
social cost of excessive low-equity clustering. High LTV loans might be
marginally more expensive than those with a greater down payment-whether
because of the FHA surcharge or the private mortgage insurance for a
conventional loan-but that does not ensure that equity levels among borrowers
are distributed in a manner that reduces the systemic risk from simultaneous
exposure to negative equity and cascading foreclosures.
For example, if the cost of private insurance for a 7% down payment loan
were sufficiently low, the vast majority of borrowers might cluster at that level
even if it was slightly more expensive than a 20% down payment. And if both
private mortgage insurance and the FHA surcharge were so expensive as to
render any loan with an LTV greater than 80% extraordinarily expensive, the
distributional concerns we raised regarding the Dodd-Frank QRM proposal
would apply with equal force. The problem is the paradigm: permitting or
prohibiting specific mortgage terms in a binary manner-e.g., with a
conforming/nonconforming distinction or flat minimum down payment of 3.5%
(FHA loans) or 20% (QRM proposal)-can lead to excessive clustering that
imposes greater systemic risk. Accordingly, as an alternative way to regulate
the distribution of home equity that is more implementable than our licensing
proposal, we suggest that Congress adopt a system of varying conformity for
mortgages purchased or guaranteed by the GSEs as described in the next
Subsection.

199.
See Glenn Somerville, U.S. Seizes Fannie, Freddie, Aims to Calm Markets,
REUTERS (Sept. 7, 2008, 7:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/07/us-fannie-freddie-idUSN
0527106320080907.
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2. A New Paradigm of Variation in Conforming Mortgages
As a starting point for this proposal, we suggest that the legislative reform
necessary to bring the GSEs out of conservatorship consider not merely how to
prevent their failure but also what roles these institutions can play in reducing
systemic risk in the mortgage market. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are
uniquely positioned to induce beneficial diversity in the distribution of home
equity because they dictate the terms under which mortgages are resold,
packaged, and distributed in mortgage-backed securities. Indeed, their implicit
government guarantee practically guarantees a monopoly on the MBS
secondary markets, suggesting that they would be well suited to influence the
entirety of national mortgage originations.
We propose redefining the "conforming mortgages" restriction on the
GSEs' activity to incorporate varying degrees of conformity. The GSEs should
have discretion to offer different prices for different levels of conformity, under
the guiding principle of reducing systemic risk by inducing an appropriate
distribution of equity. This would empower the GSEs to incentivize
beneficially varying conformity by simply setting the price they are willing to
offer for mortgage products at each level. Interestingly, a varying conformity
approach would permit more fine-tuned control than our licensing scheme: in
addition to regulating the equity level of each loan, the GSEs could set separate
prices for different characteristics-such as adjustable-rate vs. fixed-rate or
fully amortizing vs. balloon payment loans-to obtain more granular control
over the distribution of terms that affect homeowners' accumulation of equity.
The "price" for each level of conformity should be a premium on the base
discount rate offered by the GSEs to lenders. The benchmark rate for
acquisitions of mortgages by the GSEs, known as the "commitment rate," is
typically set by Fannie Mae for different delivery durations. The most common
rate is the 30-year fixed rate for delivery within 60 days,200 which ranged from
201
3.86%-4.40% in September 20132. While this rate would vary for individual
products according to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's "live pricing," 202 we
propose adding a nonconformity premium to the base rate that individual
product-specific prices are constructed from. This nonconformity premium
could adjust over time to ensure that the social cost of excessive clustering at

200.
See FNMA 30-Yr Mtg Com Del 60 Days, BANKRATE.COM, http://www.bankrate.co
m/rates/interest-rates/fannie-mae-30-year-mtg-com-del-60-days.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
201.
Mandatory Delivery Commitment - 30-Year Fixed Rate A/A, FANNIE MAE,
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/datagrid/hist net_yields/sep3O.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
The current "commitment rate" is available online. Mandatory Delivery Commitment - 30- Year Fixed
Rate A/A, FANNIE MAE, https://www.fanniemae.com/content/datagrid/hist-net_yields/cur3O.html (last
visited Feb. 14, 2014).
202.
See, e.g., Selling Whole Loans to Fannie Mae, FANNIE MAE 30 (2012),
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/jobaid/selling-whole-loans.pdf.
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certain levels of conformity would be internalized by lenders and borrowers
regardless of the specific pricing for each product.
To account for differing regional distributions of equity the GSEs could
vary the premium by the geographic area where the home is physically located.
And as noted previously, these nonconformity premia might also be
conditioned on other volatility-inducing mortgage terms discussed above (such
as balloons and interest resets) to cap their prevalence in the market. The GSEs
could even extend this pricing system to incorporate borrowers' credit scores.
For example, the GSEs could discount a small number of high-equity loans
made to low-scoring borrowers alongside low-equity loans to high-scoring
borrowers, but impose a high premium on low-equity loans to low-scoring
borrowers.
A key difference between the licensing system and this varying
conformity proposal is that licenses would apply annually, thus automatically
updating in "real-time" in response to changing equity levels and eliminating
the need to forecast the impact of a given set of mortgage terms on equity
accumulation over the life of the loan. However, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
purchase loans from originators at a single point in time, so there is no practical
way for this price to vary with the actual accumulation of equity over time.
Accordingly, the premium set by the GSEs should reflect a forecast of the
propensity for each loan to contribute to equity accumulation, akin to how the
NBA salary cap takes into account the impact of players' salaries on future
revenues.203
While such a forecast would necessarily be imperfect, the GSEs could
utilize a "probability" of equity accumulation based on the presence or absence
of specific terms in the loan. For example, a fully amortizing 30-year fixed-rate
mortgage could serve as the benchmark with a probability of equity
accumulation equal to 1, and other terms-such as adjustable rates or balloon
payments-would decrease this probability. A probability less than I would
increase the premium for that specific type of mortgage product. This is
precisely where the granularity of the varying conformity approach is
beneficial: the GSEs could vary the premium for each combination of down
payments and terms based on the loan's forecasted propensity to contribute to
low-equity clustering.
Of course, as with the licensing scheme, the GSEs will require a continual
stream of data reporting to monitor the distribution of equity in each geographic
region and adjust the premium pricing accordingly. Another implementation
advantage of this varying conformity approach is that GSEs are contractual
counterparties to mortgage originators and thus could require, as a condition of
purchasing the loan, that any mortgage servicer transmit periodic reports of

203.
See Larry Coon, 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement, LARRY COON'S NBA
SALARY CAP FAQ, http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
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principal balances to the GSEs. The GSEs could then use this data, along with
Zillow-like property appraisal technology,204 to compute and monitor an
approximate equity level for each loan purchased and repackaged in mortgagebacked securities. The GSEs already maintain loan-level data to service
payments to MBS holders, so this should not be particularly difficult to
implement.
Finally, unlike the licensing system, the varying conformity approach
would require minimal statutory reform. Congress would simply (1) broaden
the GSEs' statutory responsibilities to include monitoring the distribution of
regional equity levels among the mortgages they hold, and (2) modify the
"conforming mortgage" definition to compel the GSEs to apply a down
payment and term-specific premium to the commitment rate that would
discourage excessive clustering at low levels of equity. Unlike the licensing
scheme, this approach would not impose conditions on private contracting. In
light of the minimal statutory changes that would be required, we recommend
that Congress adopt this proposal when it considers reforming the GSEs as they
emerge from conservatorship.
Conclusion
The traditional story about what caused the Great Recession is simply that
the housing bubble popped. Robert Shiller was right to point out that the postmillennial upward spike in housing prices witnessed in city after city could not
205
be sustained.
When the bubble popped, many homeowners, who found
themselves with mortgage obligations substantially larger than the cratering
equity values in their homes, chose or were forced to default. These defaults in
turn wreaked havoc on financial institutions that held securitized pools of these
mortgages or derivative bets on these pools.
The bubble story continues to be compelling. But this Article argues that
the impact of the popping bubble was likely exacerbated by the contractual
terms included in hundreds of thousands of mortgages. In sharp contrast to
what we have called the amortization era, when successive cohorts of
homeowners would start with larger down payments and smoothly add to their
equity over time, our nation entered the housing crisis with a stock of mortgage
terms that left our housing and mortgage markets more sensitive to price
fluctuations and susceptible to default. A central claim of this Article is that the
microeconomics of contracting can have macroeconomic impacts. Specifically,
we have tried to show that systemic risk was artificially inflated by the
increased prevalence of four particular mortgage terms that increased the
chance either that borrowers would default or that borrowers would be unable

204.
Zillow.com uses data on recent sales to estimate the value of real estate.
205.
See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Be Warned Mr. Bubble's Worried Again, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/21/businessyourmoney/2 1real.html.
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to refinance a mortgage that they could no longer pay. When combined with the
dramatic increase in cash-out refinancing, the independent borrowing decisions
of millions of Americans left us with a distribution of housing equity that was
more likely to induce a destabilizing cascade of defaults, which in all likelihood
further depressed housing prices.
We have proposed three different ways that regulators might move us
back toward the beneficial equity dispersion that was a natural byproduct of the
amortization era. Our modified home mortgage interest deduction incentivizes
homeowners to opt for repayment terms that are more likely to accrue equity
over time (and less likely to require interim refinancing). Our modified risk
retention rules incentivize lenders to make analogous amortizing loans and
discourages the equity-stripping of cash-out refinancing. Finally, our leverage
licensing proposal is a "cap and trade" intervention, which directly regulates
the distribution of equity by limiting the maximum amount of various levels of
equity, and our suggestion to introduce varying conforming mortgages for
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is a more implementable alternative that does not
require extensive statutory reform.
These proposals might be adopted individually or in combination. But our
larger normative claim is that regulators should care not just about the average
homeowner equity in the system, but also about how the equity is dispersed.
The recent crisis shows that large clusters of homeowners with low equity can
be dangerous. Housing and mortgage markets would be safer if different
homeowners had different amounts of equity so that housing price fluctuations
would be less likely to induce mass waves of default.
While this Article has focused on the distribution of leverage in
mortgages, our analysis also suggests that the law should look to induce nonuniform leverage in other financial settings. In particular, our analysis suggests
that an economy might be less exposed to systemic risk if banks (and other
financial intermediaries) had different leverage levels. If all banks in an
economy are clustered at low levels of equity, then a uniform drop in the value
of their assets might analogously cause a synchronized set of bank defaults that
might be more disruptive than would occur with less clustered leverage levels.
Thus, while market competition might induce individual actors to pool toward
similar, socially deleterious levels of leverage, regulators should look to
policies that instead seek to induce separating leverage equilibria. Instead of
clinging to a norm of equal treatment under the law, our analysis identifies
circumstances where regulatory variances and licenses might be used to induce
beneficial diversity.206

See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation: A Monopsony
206.
Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 CAL. L. REv. 13, 15-16 (1992) (discussing the notion of
beneficial diversity in the regulatory context).
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